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ABSTRACT
The concept of decline has variously been applied to businesses, organizations, groups,
and government (Levine 1978; Lorange and Nelson 1987; Whetten 1980). The term
decline has also been used to describe various government agencies such as NASA. It is
the theory put forth presently that decline in its traditional form in the literature does not
apply to government agencies. Decline has been previously characterized as a time of
decreasing or restricted resources, conflict, a decrease in innovativeness, a decrease in
organizational size, a decrease in income or profits, and an organization’s inability to
adapt (Cameron, Whetten, and Kim; Weitzel and Jonsson). These characteristics,
however, are not applicable to individual government agencies; an agency’s tasks, form,
and functions are usually set and defined through legislation, its budget is tied to the
budget of the rest of the US government, and policy is usually generated at the top.
Because of these pitfalls, I propose a new model of operations at the government level:
the government agency decline model. This model posits that an agency’s operations are
in constant flux depending on the nature of the US economy at any given time and a
number of other variables. Pursuant to this, I propose that there is a strong relationship
between budget, agency performance, and power; more money in an agency’s accounts
contributes to bettering their performance, better performance leads to more power,
which can lead to an increased budget. Therefore this cycle can begin and be interrupted
at the money stage depending on the state of the American economy.

Findings show that there are relationships between economy, budgets, performance, and
power leading to an enhanced explanation of NASA’s yearly budget. Recommendations
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for further research include examining a wider array of government agencies and
developing better ways to measure power.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
What do you do after you have been to the Moon? This question has plagued not
only astronauts but NASA as it has attempted to adjust to life without a Cold War
rationale for influxes of large amounts of money. With landing on the Moon often
considered the high point in a precarious NASA history, accomplishments afterward may
seemingly be characterized as a decline in the functions of NASA. The time period
following the Apollo moon landings has been variously described as NASA’s eclipse or
decline, but what is decline? 1 What does decline mean? Or rather, how do you top the
moon?
Human beings, organizations, systems, and companies are not expected to run and
operate at their highest standards at all times. People get sick, systems run slowly, and
companies may not run as efficiently as they used to. Having an agency, organization,
corporation, or company running at its highest potential for any amount of time is an
incredible endeavor that takes significant inputs of innovation, funds, and resources. In
some instances, changes in these inputs and thus that organization’s performance may be
considered a decline in whatever sense that the phrase is used.
Yet, it is here that a difference between public (or government) and private arisesif a private organization experiences decline, it is generally said to have fewer resources,
lower profits, a lack of innovativeness and/or long-term planning, more turnover among
employees, and a growing rigidity in the organization. 2 In public or governmental
organizations, budgets are generally dependent on overall government budgeting and the
tasks assigned to organizations and how they go about them are often regulated by an
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agency’s enabling legislation and a myriad of other rules and statutes. The problem thus
encountered is how to reconcile the idea of decline with the inherent characteristics of a
governmental agency.
The primary focus of this investigation is an examination of organizational
decline relevant to politicized government agencies, specifically NASA. Because of the
nature of governmental agencies, the idea of organizational decline as it is presented in
the literature, I hypothesize, is irrelevant to government organizations; therefore I
propose a model of governmental agency decline (GAD) in which an agency’s operations
are in constant flux depending on the nature of the US economy at any given time and a
number of other variables. Pursuant to this, I propose that there is a strong relationship
between budget, agency performance, and power; more money in an agency’s accounts
contributes to bettering their performance, better performance leads to more power,
which can lead to an increased budget. Therefore this cycle can begin and be interrupted
at the money stage depending on the state of the American economy.
There is perhaps no better agency to examine in regards to this problem than the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Its history of publicly
identifiable programs, pursuits, challenges and failures makes it quite vulnerable to
declarations of decline. The first flight of the reusable space shuttle and the successful
Mars rovers were publicly accessible events that exhibited what makes NASA great; at
the same time, the disasters Challenger and Columbia were public tragedies that signify
NASA’s failures. While the public may not always observe the successes and failures of
the Departments of Agriculture or Treasury, they can readily see whether NASA
launches made it into space or shuttles made it home.
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This is not to say that the analysis done here would not or could not apply to other
government agencies; the very nature of NASA that their achievements, their outputs, are
readily available to be examined, put it in a unique position compared to other agencies to
be studied. One could certainly trace the performance of the US Geological Survey and
identify changes, whether positive or negative, in its performance, but NASA offers us a
rare chance at examining an agency that is charged with highly technical tasks and must
protect human life to the best of its ability at the same time.
NASA at its heart is a government organization that does not exist in a vacuum,
unlike the environment in which its members at times operate. Budgetary politics,
election year ploys, and changes in political environments can and do affect NASA and
the way in which it operates. The challenges that politics puts on NASA only complicate
its missions and actions. It is this interplay between government and NASA that
explanation is sought for here.
Who or What is NASA?
Variously, in the first pages of this examination, NASA has been referred to as a
government organization, a public agency, and a group that has readily identifiable
missions, successes, and failures. One of the key concepts that must be identified here at
the outset is what NASA is, how it operates, and perhaps even why it operates as it does.
To be sure, a large organization is almost always made up of smaller component parts
and people; it is easy enough to state that the sum of the parts equals the whole but how
do those component parts influence the whole? While Downs and Wilson provide
rudimentary mechanisms to explain this in the form of their theories on bureaucracy, it
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should be sufficient here to identify NASA as an organization with a particular culture or
way of doing things. 3
But the culture is only the way NASA goes about doing things, how does it decide
what it does in the first place? NASA is the primary arm of the US federal government
for executing US space policy and as such, ends are often decided for it with the means
being left to NASA. Is it the president, the Congress, or some combination of those
actors that decide what NASA will do? This topic will be addressed in chapter two, but it
is important to note, as Krasner does, that whether the agency has the ability to decide for
itself what to do is still a function of presidential policy. 4 Even when the president is not
setting specific policy, “some policy options are never presented;” in this sense, how does
NASA decide what options to present and what options to argue for? 5
NASA decision-making is very much a result of its culture in that the missions
they strive to achieve and push for are missions that have been in their blood from the
beginning- human spaceflight. No matter the resources at their disposal, “the agency
agenda has been consistent (albeit tactically flexible) while the external agenda often
changes rapidly in different directions.” 6 Therefore, the major policy decisions, while
being generally acceptable at the presidential level, are usually formed and argued for
strongly by NASA leaders as a result of their history and culture.
Plan of Study
It is the hypothesis here that the idea of decline as presented in the literature and
all too often used by others to characterize NASA is irrelevant; characteristics such as
increasing bureaucracy and competition, and decreasing innovativeness and
profits/income are characteristics that do not apply only to government agencies but
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rather government as a whole. In order to examine this idea, this study will proceed in
three phases: a critical review of decline as presented in the literature, an examination of
the history of NASA between 1970 and 2005, and an explanation of the governmental
agency decline model, and a test of that model using NASA as a case study.
Governmental Agency Decline
It would be very easy to declare that NASA has declined and perhaps, in certain
cases, one could say that is has declined. There are two questions that need to be
answered, however. One, what is decline? Decline has been conceptualized in a variety
of ways as shown in table 1.1. Not all of these can equally be applied to government
organizations as will be examined shortly. The question left to be answered, then, is what
characteristics explain or demonstrate governmental agency decline.
Table 0-1: Characteristics of Organizational Decline
Characteristics
Increasing conflict internally
Increasing rigidity
Decreasing morale
Lack of innovation
Elimination of slack resources
Concern with survival
Inability to adapt
Decreasing sales
Decreasing profits
Increasing competition
Decreasing capacity for innovation
Decreasing flexibility
Decreasing number or excess of personnel
Decreasing demand for services
Lack of clear goals
Loss of effective communication
Outdated structure

Sources
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
McCurdy 1991
McCurdy 1991
Whetten 1980; Lorange and Nelson 1987
Whetten 1980
Lorange and Nelson 1987
Lorange and Nelson 1987
Lorange and Nelson 1987
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Many researchers are already familiar with the work of Downs with his theory of
organizational life cycles and Wilson’s writings on bureaucracy. In general, both of these
theories identify cycles through which government agencies and organizations go through
with Downs focusing primarily on the beginnings of an agency. As will be discussed in
chapter two, neither Downs nor Wilson’s descriptions of bureaucracy hold up under
examination. What I believe will be found in the course of an examination of the decline
literature, is that the idea of decline as traditionally presented by authors such as
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim and Weitzel and Jonsson are not applicable to government
agencies which leads to the second question that needs to be addressed: if the traditional
idea of organizational decline is not applicable, what is? The model thus put forth,
governmental agency decline (or GAD), is designed to address the inability of the decline
literature to apply to government. In dismissing the idea of a total decline, this model
posits that government operations or an agency’s operations are continually in flux
dependent partially on the state of the national economy. A visual representation of this
model appears in figure 1-1.

Figure 0-1: A Model of Governmental Agency Decline
6

In this model, which assumes that actors act rationally, an increase in an agency’s
budget allows it to funnel more money into operations, safety, and new programs
increasing the agency’s overall performance. As an agency’s performance increases and
it is seen by others in government as doing a better job, the agency’s power and influence
with others in the government thus increases (for our purposes here, power is defined as
the ability of person or subject A to get what they want from person or subject B; this is
discussed more fully in chapter four). This power and influence often translates into
more money in the next budgetary cycle and so goes the model. It is very important,
however, to note that this cycle is started at and can be interrupted at the budgetary or
money position. If the Congress simply does not have the money to give to agencies for
whatever variety of reasons, no amount of agency lobbying will be able to overcome that.
Conversely, though, what happens if the national economy improves but the
agency does not have sufficient amounts of power to acquire what it would like from
Congress? Certain scenarios can be imagined where, either the leadership of an agency
or an agency’s actions have received serious rebukes from the Congress; for instance, the
current Congress was involved in a debate concerning the now former Attorney General,
Alberto Gonzalez and his leadership of the Department of Justice. But, for agencies in or
out of favor with the Congress, minor controversies or successes do not necessarily equal
increases or decreases in budgets. Wildavsky puts forth the idea of “fair share” in his
work on the congressional budgeting process explaining that, through the years, an idea
of how much money an agency is budgeted is solidified in the minds of representatives. 7
While Wildavsky dos not address the idea of governmental decline, his explanation of
fair share within the budgeting process helps to explain why agency budgets remain fairly
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stable whether representatives and senators are fans of particular agencies and
departments or not.
NASA’s History
While the histories of the Space Age and NASA have been written ad nauseum, it
is the aim of this paper to look at the years following the moon landing with a specific
focus on the interplay between NASA and the rest of the government. I find that this
exposition is needed for two interrelated reasons which will be discussed in turn: one,
those scholars who have criticized NASA’s performance and track record have focused
only on specific instances and not the entirety of NASA’s history; two, there only seems
to be concern among academics with NASA’s intragovernmental relations when major
programs are up for debate.
If the Challenger accident had not occurred in 1986, would the space shuttle
decision and design process been put under the microscope so soon? Would there have
been any need in examining NASA’s culture and its role in the accident? While
hypothetical questions are hardly, if ever, answered, examining this problem from that
standpoint is helpful. All too often, people are not spurred to action unless a major
accident or disaster occurs; this “Pearl Harbor” effect has occurred all too often in recent
history- September 11th, the federal response, or lack thereof, to natural disasters,
Challenger and Columbia. In the wake of both shuttle accidents, authors have come out
of the woodworks explaining how NASA has done wrong and should be abolished.
Garwin writes, “The Challenger disaster has revealed in the primary NASA program bad
design, bad management, and inadequate oversight.” 8 Murray, again in the wake of
Challenger, criticized the lack of debate concerning NASA’s programs 9 and more
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recently Klerkx contends that Columbia’s accident has allowed NASA to keep human
spaceflight out of the private sectors’ hands. 10 The point is, however, that none of these
authors have noted the achievements that NASA has made, instead criticizing NASA for
only one event.
I am not saying that these criticisms are unfair; indeed, serious errors and
miscalculations were made not only in the shuttle disasters but also in lost science
missions such as the Mars Polar Lander and the Mars Climate Orbiter. This increased
criticism also leads to the second hole in the NASA literature- when concentration on
NASA has increased, then more analyses on NASA’s interactions with the rest of the
government are also examined. Just like the authors who have funneled criticism at
NASA in the wake of disaster, in order to examine the ups and downs of NASA between
1970 and 2005, we must also fill in the holes between accidents and increased attention.
Government interactions do not only happen right before or immediately after a critical
period of time; they occur all the time.
Disasters should not be the only impetus for increased examination of anything,
be it FEMA, NASA, or homeland security. What is needed in the analysis of decline is a
baseline from against which to compare NASA’s successes and failures over time.
Seeing the gaps in the literature between the major milestones of NASA such as the
shuttle and ISS decisions and Challenger and Columbia, a major part of this study will
look at completing an analysis of NASA between crises and major decisions.
Conclusion
There is much ground to be covered in this study, but I believe these are questions
worth taking the time to answer. In examining what decline means to government and
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the agencies that make it up, we can endeavor to understand how agencies operate and
how government operates. Further insights into the nature of government operations help
to shed light on what goes on behind the scenes. Further, if a more accurate description
of decline as applied to government agencies can be achieved, perhaps new insights into
NASA can also be found. Additionally, While Downs and Wilson focus specifically on
agencies, neither incorporates larger influences into their models of agency operations.
The work presented here aims to expand the work to include larger factors including
power, economic conditions, and budgets.
It would be a monumental task for anyone to decide what to do once your life’s
dream has been achieved. NASA was born out of a Cold War desire to beat the Soviet
Union in the Space Race and eventually to the moon. Its goal thus achieved, what do you
do? Anything that is not the moon could certainly be seen as a letdown for NASA;
continually going into low-Earth orbit is certainly not as exciting as venturing out beyond
the atmosphere into deep space. Andrew Smith tells an intriguing story in his book
Moondust of what happened to those twelve astronauts, those twelve men, who between
the years of 1969 and 1972 ventured to the moon. He writes of the various twists and
turns that many of these men took in their lives once they had to adjust to life after the
moon. But what happened to NASA? What happened to the agency once it fulfilled its
task? NASA has not gone away, yet has continued to fly despite setbacks in the form of
Challenger and Columbia. My mission here is to find out what happened to NASA and
hopefully to explain why.
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CHAPTER 2: BUREAUCRACY, BUDGETING AND DECLINE IN
GOVERNMENT
When considering how NASA operates or has operated, the last thing we can imagine
is that it operates in a vacuum. There exist a number of different and varying political
pressures, organizational issues, and financial matters. For NASA, organizing and
putting into motion technical missions of the highest degree of difficulty could be
considered hard enough; but to put humans safely into space within specific budget and
political constraints is even more difficult.
Scholars have put forth various theories and explanations of bureaucracy, budgeting,
and decline within government, some of which will be explored here. In order to explore
how and why NASA has operated as it has between 1970 and 2005 the analysis requires a
serious look at existing theories on these subjects. In this chapter, I will explore the
existing literature on bureaucracy, budgeting, and organizational decline in turn.
Bureaucracy
The first question that needs to be answered concerning this topic is what exactly
bureaucracy is. At times, it seems like a buzzword to be bandied about, criticizing the
government in some way, shape, or form. But in reality, the bureaucracy encompasses
integral parts of the government, if not the government in its entirety. In fact, MerriamWebster defines “bureaucracy” as all of the characteristics previously discussed;
bureaucracy can be “a body of nonelective government officials,” “government
characterized by specialization of functions, adherence to fixed rules, and a hierarchy of
authority,” or “a system of administration marked by officialism, red tape, and
proliferation.” 1 Bureaucracy can be both beneficial and negative all at the same time
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then. It provides a system of objective and reliable organization that allows the
government to continue to operate but this same reliance on stable organizational patterns
may not respond well and/or quickly to new issues or situations.
The explosive growth that the US government experienced during the New Deal
period is reflected in the growing amount of literature throughout the 1950s and 1960s
that deals exclusively with bureaucracy and organizational politics. Anthony Downs’s
1967 book Inside Bureaucracy is perhaps one of the best examples of this new niche in
scholarly studies. While Downs intends “to develop a useful theory of bureaucratic
decisionmaking,” he explicates a theory of life cycles of bureaus which is of interest
here. 2 I will briefly outline his life cycle theory and examine its application and limits to
agencies such as NASA.
Downs’s Life Cycle of Bureaus
Downs begins by postulating four different types of ways that bureaus come into
being: (1) coming from Max Weber, “the routinization of charisma;” (2) a bureau that is
created purposefully for a specific reason out of various groups; (3) “a new bureau can
split off from an existing bureau”; and (4) a bureau may come into being through what
Downs calls “’entrepreneurship’ if a group of men promoting a particular policy gains
enough support to establish and operate a large nonmarket organization devoted to that
policy.” 3 In all of these cases, however, people are enthusiastic about it and its creation,
people who are “zealots” and “advocates”, essentially dominate the new bureaus. 4
In turn, these zealots and advocates push for distinct functions for their bureau to
carry out and the autonomy to do so as they see fit. It is like walking a tightrope,
however, for these new functionaries, as they strive for independence, they also must
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cultivate support for their activities in people who would continue to support their
operations. In the case of government operations, new bureaus must continually struggle
for the support of those in Congress who would continue to support their operations in
the form of funding. It is interesting though, that this would play a part in Downs’s life
cycle theory. Because the creation of new government agencies can be quite contentious
at times, establishing a new agency or department often requires an enormous amount of
start-up funding and requirements, new organizational patterns, and exercise of political
power. One would assume, then, that this new agency, simply by being established
would overcome this initial struggle for external support.
A quite recent example of this phenomenon can be found in the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security following the September 11th terrorist attacks.
Various proponents argued for consolidating various agencies and new ones underneath a
brand new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stating that a new department would
centralize homeland security operations rather than having them scattershot throughout
the government. Thus, the DHS would be able to secure a greater amount of control
through its creation and would have more authority to carry out operations that would
attempt to safeguard the homeland. Yet, still others argued that creation of the DHS
would create more bureaucratic barriers and needlessly expand government.
Downs does attempt to address this pitfall yet ultimately dismisses it saying that
“initial external sources of support are usually weak, scattered, and not accustomed to
relations with the bureau” so the bureau still must seek out sources of support, a
constituency. 5 Once these sources of supports have been found, the bureau or agency
generally undergoes a rapid growth to meet what Downs calls its “initial survival
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threshold.” 6 This threshold represents a point at which the bureau has become
sufficiently useful and old enough to establish regular relations with its clientele. 7
This rapid growth is certainly not the only state in which bureaus operate; Downs
theorizes that both “The major causes of both growth and decline in bureaus are rooted in
exogenous factors in their environment. As society develops over time, certain social
functions grow in prominence and others decline.” 8 These outside environmental factors
are not the only determinants of how an agency behaves though, according to Downs; the
make up, or type, of employees that operate within the agency also affects what the
agency does and how they do it. In other words, “if most of the officials occupying key
positions in a bureau are of one type (that is, conservers, climbers, and so on), then the
bureau and its behavior will be dominated by the traits typical of that type.” 9 This idea
thus assumes two things: one, that agency behavior reflects the behavior of a core group
of individuals, and two, that the type of people that occupy those core positions are
affected by the state of the agency.
Downs continues on to describe only one of these implicit ideas, that the type of
people that make up the core of an agency is affected by the state of the agency itself.
Rapid organizational growth, he theorizes, leads to an increase in opportunities and
promotions particularly for those “climbers” who are interested in such opportunities. 10
Climbers are more inclined to pursue innovation and thus in rapidly growing new
agencies, more innovation-focused climbers occupy the higher ranks. 11 Soon though,
“growth acceleration… runs into serious obstacles.” 12 Downs provides some examples
of what could cause the growth to slow down and eventually stop: the social function of
the agency decreases in relative importance compared to the importance it engendered at
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its creation, other bureaus become increasingly competitive, the agency finds difficulty in
continuing to produce good results, and conflicts among the climbers who increasingly
populate the agency over internal politics redirects their attention from the activities of
the agency. 13 In any case, the agency begins to experience declining growth and in turn
this lower growth rate influences different operations in the bureau.
As the agency begins to slow down its growth, Downs writes that the climbers
who once occupied the top positions will recognize this and transfer, or jump, to other
bureaus. 14 In turn, “those who have reached high positions in the bureau will lose hope
of climbing much higher, and will tend to become conservers instead of climbers” and
the agency will become more conservative in character. 15 But again, this assumption
hinges on taking for granted that the type pf people occupying key positions depends on
external factors that influence the growth rate of an agency and that the agency is truly
reflective of the behavior of certain individuals, neither of which Downs fully explores.
That an agency’s culture, its way of doing things, is inherently affected by a
certain group of peoples is something that a wide variety of scholars rebut. Kay writes
that, in reference to NASA, “the agency’s long range goals, priorities, timetables, and
even to some degree its method of operation (as with any major public organization) are
shaped by a number of complex factors, including the bureaucratic, budgetary,
legislative, electoral, and other political processes of the US federal government, as well
as the demands of a wide variety of outside interest groups.” 16 McCurdy, whose article
relating Downs’s life cycle theory and NASA we will address shortly, argues that it was
experience that taught NASA to become more conservative, particularly its experience
with failures. 17
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Aside from scholars who have studied NASA in particular, other authors who
focus on organizational studies often advocate a varying point of view. Lorange and
Nelson argue that “With economic success,” rather than decreasing growth rates, “a
change in emphasis from innovation to tightened administration tends to create an
increasingly rigid culture.” 18 Wilson has a problem with viewing an organization as
having a certain culture to begin with since this presumption assumes that “an
organization will have a culture; many, perhaps most, will have several cultures.” 19
Without explaining exactly how or why a small number of individuals control how the
agency operates, Downs’s argument simply may not hold up.
Downs goes on to identify possible ways in which the age of a bureau may affect
its performance. Bureaus may perform their tasks better with more experience, they
“develop more formalized rule systems covering more and more of the possible situations
they are likely to encounter,” bureaus may focus more on survival rather than fulfilling
their “social functions,” and the number of administrators rises. 20 While the first two of
these characterizations have been acknowledged and examined by scholars such as
McCurdy and Wilson, the second characteristic, a focus on survival, seems
counterintuitive. Once an agency has reached its survival threshold, as described by
Downs, the support and base of constituents is fairly guaranteed. The question then
becomes, why would the agency shift focus to survival rather than its stated goals and
missions? Downs gives us a clue in drawing in the influence of the growing number of
administrators in the agency- while never saying so, the assumption is that these
administrators are conservers in nature which would lead the agency to act conservatively
to ensure its survival. 21 But again, we are led back to the original assumption that an
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agency’s behavior reflects the behavior of a select group of people. One other question is
pulled from this discussion, however, and that is why should an agency, who is already
fairly ensured of its survival, worry about it?
Downs’s argument is summed up quite easily: a new agency is created, it
experiences rapid growth until it reaches a certain age, maturity, and survival threshold,
growth begins to slow down and the types of people that comprise the agency changes.
In actually applying this theory, however, the questions are more numerous. McCurdy
attempts to test the life cycle theory against NASA and finds that “the development of the
US civilian space program followed the pattern predicted by the life-cycle theory” in that
it had rapidly expanded and then declined. 22 McCurdy bases this claim on employment
statistics citing an aging NASA workforce and a lower turnover rate. 23 The assumption
is that the make up of employees becomes more stable over time, climbers (in Downs’s
terminology) depart, and the workforce becomes more conservative. But again, does the
make up of a core group of employees affect the overall behavior of the agency?
Another question that McCurdy seeks to answer is whether there has been an
increase in bureaucracy in NASA. Using survey data from NASA employees, McCurdy
finds that among those who worked for NASA during the Apollo program into the 1980s,
95% either strongly agreed or agreed with the statement “The amount of paperwork has
increased substantially since I came to work for NASA.” 24 But is increased paperwork
and bureaucracy such a bad thing? There is wide agreement that as an agency ages, its
procedures become more stable and formalized, which would perhaps increase
paperwork and bureaucracy, but there is little agreement as to whether this is an allaround bad thing. Having a paper trail and predictable operations could be considered
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positives in the government sphere. Knowing how a procedure goes and knowing that
that procedure will be the same each and every time it is used could also be argued to be
beneficial.
The third question that McCurdy looked to tackle is the question of conservatism.
McCurdy writes that “In the 1988 survey, agency professionals agreed that ‘at the
management level, NASA is dominated by people who are cautious and inclined to avoid
risks.’” 25 This gives us a hint that Downs does not provide as to the mechanism through
which the personality of a small group of people affects the behavior of the agency as a
whole; conservative leaders and project managers who are less inclined to take on risks,
may not pursue new and engaging projects that are technically risky. Instead, they may
wish to design proven systems and programs that are all but guaranteed to succeed. This
may look good as an agency success, but it does not propel space exploration forward.
As a result, these decisions could be termed conservative.
But what causes this conservatism? Downs proposes that it is the age of an
agency and search for survival that encourages agency leaders to become more
conservative. Klerkx echoes this in describing the decision to pursue the space shuttle as
a decision that changed NASA from “an organization that would risk its future for an
outrageous goal – bold and daring, worthy of sacrifice- to one that wanted more than
anything else to simply survive.” 26 But McCurdy in his later book on NASA, writes that,
“Decreased tolerance for failure discouraged testing…. As political support for the space
program diminished and the cost of test hardware increased, failure even on a test flight
unleashed a barrage of criticism.” 27 Thus the question becomes, do pressures to become
more conservative come from within or without an agency? Do pressures to be
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successful influence the agency and thus the core group of people? Or does the pressure
to be successful and thus more conservative come from the people themselves? The data
reported by McCurdy on the 1988 survey of NASA employees provides a few clues.
McCurdy reports that NASA employees continued to “profess faith in the underlying
norms of their original test and exploration culture” and “more agreed than did not that
‘NASA employees are allowed to fail and learn from their mistakes.’” 28
We are left with mixed conclusions, then, about this idea of a life-cycle of
bureaus. The rapid expansion of bureaus is to be expected following their creation and at
some point that growth has to stop. I have purposefully avoided characterizing this
slower growth as decline because the questions concerning “decline” are just as many
and the answers just as few. Increased bureaucracy is not necessarily a bad thing, and the
mechanism through which a small number of people influence overall agency behavior is
questionable. Nonetheless, Downs gives us a good starting point to continue the
discussion of agency behavior.
Wilson and Bureaucracy
In a later examination of bureaucracy, James Wilson focuses on how
bureaucracies operate and why they operate in the fashion that they do. Expanding on
Downs’s idea that agencies attempt to acquire sufficient autonomy to perform their tasks,
Wilson describes what he calls the critical task. To begin with, the agency must decide
upon what their critical task is, then there must be agreement within the agency as to
what that task is. This sense of mission then leads the agency to acquire enough
autonomy to perform the task in the way they see fit. 29 Wilson also takes the position
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that people’s actions and beliefs influence the overall behavior of the agency but expands
it somewhat.
For Wilson, it is the whole of the lower and upper-level employees that agree
upon the critical task at hand. As for the methods by which those tasks get accomplished,
it is again an unspoken agreement among all involved. Wilson writes:
When a government agency is created, it is not assembled out of people who are
blanks slates on which the organization can write at will. Except for young
employees getting their first jobs, the operators will have worked for other
organizations, often other government agencies. Indeed, most new agencies are
formed out of bits and pieces of old ones…. These people had learned certain
ways of doing things. If a new agency has ambiguous goals, the employees’ prior
experiences will influence how its tasks get defined. 30
In this way, a great number of employees influence how the agency operates rather than
the personality of a select few. This egalitarian outlook has advantages over the Downs
argument; it provides for the influence of a great many number of people, particularly at
the lower level, rather than just a select few at the top, it recognizes that there are often a
number of ways to go about doing things and that it is only through time and effort that
an agreement results about the proper operation for that agency. Indeed, Wilson
explicates this idea arguing that over time, certain definitions of the critical task grew in
popularity and others waned. 31
Wilson is very cautious concerning the topic of culture. As noted before, he
chides the assumption of a single culture within an agency instead choosing to recognize
that there could be a number of cultures within an agency. But, when a single culture
does permeate throughout the agency, Wilson argues that the organization thus has a
sense of mission. 32 Again, though, could it be possible for a number of different cultures
have the same sense of missions? Taking NASA as an example, when it was created out
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of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), it was comprised of
groups of employees from NACA and elsewhere. Each of these employees and groups of
employees came with preconceived notions and a certain culture, a way of doing things.
Aside from this issue, however, Wilson goes on to discuss how this single culture
and the mission get developed. With varying ideas and missions, it is often difficult to
specify to the operators, the lower-level employees who actually carry out the task, what
exactly they need to do and how to do it. Further, the small group of people at the top
may have limited influence about how the task is accomplished as they are confined by
“a variety of political and legal constraints.” 33 But still, “sometimes an organization is
endowed with a sense of mission despite ambiguous goals, personal predispositions,
group pressures, and situational imperatives. This usually occurs during the formative
experience of the organization, and experience shaped and interpreted by a founder who
imposes his or her will on the first generation of operators in a way that profoundly
affects succeeding generations.” 34
This sense of mission that, beyond all doubts eventually is adopted plays an
important part in the shaping of an agency. If a task does not play an integral part in the
mission, it may not be pursued to the same degree of voracity as other tasks and goals. 35
Further, tasks that do not approximate with the culture have less of a chance of being
pursued because those tasks do not seem appropriate to the agency. For example, NASA
was created primarily to win the space race against the Soviets and to eventually send
humans into space. One mission that has been pushed on the agency in recent decades is
the study of planet Earth; this task, however, is not something that is natural to the
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majority of the agency. As such, the agency has resisted such exploration. The shortlived Mission to Planet Earth in the 1990s produced few missions.
How does one control the mission and the tasks? Is there any way that the
mission and the culture can be changed? As will be examined in Chapter 3, the NASA
culture has indeed changed over time, from one of a technical and engineering based
culture, to one that focuses on results and success. What did this change result from?
For NASA, it could be the focus on survival following Apollo. Forced to pursue a space
shuttle for reasons of economy, NASA was pressured to achieve results and as such, the
culture changed. In this example, then, the culture and mission changed as a result of
changing pressures on the agency that could arguably have also come from within.
Those within NASA perceived that their survival was at stake and thus relied on certain
pronouncements of the space shuttle that they could not follow through on. This
argument, though, could also be reversed. Because of the changing context outside of
NASA, specifically the lessening focus on the space race and space operations, NASA
had to change its method of operating. Instead of advocating large-scale, expensive
human spaceflight missions, NASA adapted and pursued a program that it described as
cost-effective and efficient. Most likely, the resulting space shuttle program was a
combination of these two arguments, but perhaps we will never know for sure.
Similar to Downs’s argument concerning increased conservatism in the agency,
Wilson counters by saying that the resistance to innovation is not surprising. The
creation of an agency is designed “in large part to replace the uncertain expectations and
haphazard activities of voluntary endeavors with the stability and routine of organized
relationships.” 36 Thus, increasing conservatism and bureaucracy may not be such a bad
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thing. Also, bureaucracy and conservatism could be seen as characteristic of government
as a whole. Indeed, McCurdy notes that it is difficult to isolate the amount of
bureaucracy as a result of aging and the amount of bureaucracy that could be attributed to
the government as a whole. 37 Clearly, we cannot treat the agency as existing in a
vacuum; we still must consider the rest of the government and its influence upon
agencies.
Budgeting and Policy Making
Most executive agencies do not create their own policies nor do they generate and
approve their own budgets; the executive and legislative branches play important roles in
the life of any government agency and particularly NASA. In the previous chapter, a
concerted attempt was made to examine the intergovernmental relations of NASA,
specifically pertaining to the interaction between NASA, the Congress, and the president.
Here, we will look at the literature concerning these interactions and the various theories
concerning how and why things get done the way they are.
How Policy Gets Made
Anyone with a basic knowledge of how government works knows that generally,
the president will set, or at least attempt to set, policy for the executive agencies. While
what a policy may cost is kept in mind when designing and setting it, in the case of the
US government, the trend has been for the policy to be set and then money budgeted by
the Congress for it. Thus, we will first consider the genesis of policy and different
methods for implementing it.
One of the greatest intersections between this policy-making topic and NASA is
Paul Schulman’s analysis of nonincremental policy making. Beginning with two different
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versions of policy-making, Schulman examines incremental policy-making and the
divisibility paradigm of policy-making, arguing that “these paradigms have deprived
policy analysis and public administration of attention to a class of policy enterprises
which fit into neither framework,” nonincremental policy-making. 38

According to

Schulman, there is a class of policies that cannot be made in small steps (incrementally)
and must be made comprehensively (not divisibly). 39 Using, NASA, more specifically
manned space exploration, as his main example, Schulman explores this class of
nonincremental policies.
Throughout his study, Schulman identifies a number of characteristics that he
believes are typical of nonincremental policies. The first of these is that “critical mass”
points are inherent and required for the development of nonincremental policies. 40
Similar to Downs’s critical survival threshold in that it requires a certain amount of
support to ensure its continuance, these critical mass points represent the point at which
political and resource commitments are available to support a given policy. 41 Schulman
argues that the amount of public pressure that arose following the Soviet launch of
Sputnik in 1957 and the political pressure to catch up to the Soviets amounted to this
critical point. Indeed, as has been seen with major public policy innovations from the
New Deal to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the creation of new
agencies to affect new policy has come only after enough support has been acquired to
create that agency.
Again, similar to the Downs argument, Schulman believes that once a
nonincremental policy has been implemented, it expands greatly in order to overcome the
“inertia, external resistance, or internal start-up problems.” 42 There are two comments in
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order here. From Schulman’s own argument, he previously stated that it takes a great
amount of public pressure and political support for a nonincremental policy to be
successful; if that is the case, then the policy should not have to grow so much as to
overcome initial resistance. If there was any amount of resistance, it might not have
come into being in the first place. Two, this mirrors quite closely Downs’s life cycle
theory and its advancement of rapid growth for a young agency. Up to this point, in fact,
there are very few differences between Schulman and Downs with the major one being
that Schulman writes about the policy and Downs writes about the agency. Yet in the
case of NASA, the agency was created to advocate the policy, which at the time was
beating the Soviet Union in the space race.
Another Schulman argument that deserves to be discussed here is that of
consolidation. Arguing that “The nonincremental policy requires an extensive
consolidation because of the close interdependency of its component parts,” Schulman
posits that consolidation of various functionaries is important for the policy to be
successful. 43 Schulman finds evidence of this in NASA in that the research and
development projects of, for example, rocket boosters, computers, the manned vehicle,
etc., all had to work together and be consolidated under one umbrella. Any organization
will have subsidiaries that deal with their own details and programs, so this may not
necessarily be characteristic of nonincremental policies. In addition, NASA was
essentially created to take space operations away from the military and thus consolidate
all operations under one civilian agency. 44
Schulman further discusses the subject of decline in nonincremental policies, but
we will save this discussion for later in this chapter. But what should be apparent from
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this discussion of Schulman’s argument is that the only real difference between it and
earlier arguments, particularly Downs’s, is that Schulman reserves his argument for
policy while others focus on the agency. Yet for all the agencies and departments
created, they are designed to fulfill specific policy needs, thus the question becomes, how
do you separate the policy from the agency and the agency from the policy? Clearly,
when Schulman talks about rapid expansion and consolidation, the policy itself does not
do this, but the agency. Then these characteristics must be examples of nonincremental
agency creation, which could arguably be every agency creation. Creating the
Department of Homeland Security or the Tennessee Valley Authority are major actions,
certainly nonincremental. If this is the case, then Schulman is simply stating the obvious.
In another interesting article published prior to the Schulman study, Krasner asks
the question of whether bureaucracies are important in the foreign policy-making arena.
While he focuses on the foreign policy apparatus, the conclusions he draws can still be
applied here. Attempting to take the focus away from the bureaucracies and place it back
in the hands of a single person who can control policy (the president), Krasner argues
that:
The President chooses most of the important players and sets the rules. He selects
the men who head the large bureaucracies. These individuals must share his
values…. The values which bureau chiefs assign to policy outcomes are not
independent. They are related through a perspective shared with the President. 45
Continuing along this line of reasoning, Krasner admits that the president is never
confronted with all the options or all the information as a result of some bureaucratic
posturing. 46 Those in the bureaucracy who are in charge of briefing the president and
presenting options may choose to present the information in such a way that the president
favors the bureaucratic preference. But, Krasner argues, if this is the case, then the
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president is not paying very much attention to the agency and its current situation.
“Presidential attention” on an agency “is a function of presidential values. The Chief
Executive involved himself in those areas which he determines to be important.” 47
Therefore, whether the bureaucracy is allowed to pursue policies of its own choosing or
have policies enforced upon them are still a function of the values and beliefs of one
person and not the many in the bureaucracy. Krasner’s analysis thus makes policymaking a top-down affair; the president will either impose a policy or allow one to be
imposed on him. Either way, it is a conscious decision in the executive branch of which
policy is made and pursued.
There is evidence of both of these cases in the history of NASA. Beginning in the
1960s with Kennedy’s moon landing goal, policy was enforced from the top-down.
There have been many arguments and analyses putting forth the position that having their
mission given to them from the president has set NASA up for many a failure. 48 Yet
since the 1970s, NASA has made policy from the bottom-up; in pushing the bureaucratic
desires, the president, the executive, has simply gone along because NASA and space
exploration have simply not been one of the major priorities.
Yet, as a counterpoint to the Krasner argument, the Space Exploration Initiative
(SEI) proposed by President George H.W. Bush in 1989 is an example of top-down
policy-making that failed. Kay has remarked that “SEI appeared to present the agency
with a larger purpose, a mission, that moved it out of the supporting roles it had been
playing.” 49 The initial assumption, then, is that this sort of policy would be favorable to
the NASA bureaucracy. The non-existent nature of the program, however, would give us
clues that favorable it was not. Following the announcement of SEI, NASA pursued a
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90-day report examining the prospects and costs of SEI and eventually gave the program
a price tag of billions of dollars. 50 A program with such a high price tag (given by
NASA itself) was “dead on arrival” in Congress and gave some the belief that NASA
intentionally killed the program to instead focus on the space shuttles and the space
station. 51
Nearly fifteen years following the announcement of SEI, President George W.
Bush introduced the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). And unlike the experience that
his father had in 1989, the VSE seems to be moving along through development and into
existence. After almost 35 years of either bottom-up or failed top-down policy-making, a
policy that has been announced by the president for the space agency has chances of
succeeding. But why now? The argument that NASA was weakened as an agency
following Columbia may have some truth to it but in 1989, NASA was still picking up
the pieces from Challenger. Some would argue that the spending on the war on terror
during George W. Bush’s tenure might have dimmed the prospects for a new space
policy, yet that has not happened yet. George H.W. Bush did not have an active war that
needed billions in funding and his policy was dismissed.
Perhaps the only clue that we might have to the acceptance of the VSE and not the
SEI is the decade separating them. As discussed in chapter 2, the mid-1990s marked a
turn around in public feeling for NASA and space exploration. With the outpouring of
grief and the sad reaffirmation of the space program’s existence, the timing was simply
right for a new space policy. 52 Downs and/or Schulman may variously term this a critical
point that would lead to a reinvigoration of the agency and a new agenda to follow.
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So what conclusions can be made concerning policy-making specifically for
NASA? Contrary to Schulman, nonincremental policies such as the space shuttle
program or the space station are decided upon even without the appropriate amount of
political and resource commitment that may be deemed necessary. And contrary to
Krasner, the bureaucracy often has a say in presidential policy-making whether the
president likes it or not. Perhaps the only conclusion that can be drawn is that policymaking is never absolute; it is not one thing or the other. Policy-making, again, is not
done in a vacuum- a ringing theme throughout this chapter. Other factors must be
considered when considering policy; presidential support will not cut it not will
bureaucratic pressure. What that leads us to is the Congress and its power of the purse.
The Congress and Budgeting
For all of the pronouncements of wanting to cut spending and balance the budget,
every year, the US budget seems to get larger and larger. From pork barrel spending to
hurricane recovery and the war on terror, particularly now, the US budget seems to be a
magnet for higher totals. Nothing can be done unless money for it is appropriated and
approved of by the Congress; this makes an examination of budgeting incredibly
important. When policies such as the Vision for Space Exploration or the space shuttle
program is announced by the president, it must also be approved of by the Congress in
the form of money and authorization. Indeed, Greenberg writes, “the politics of science
is registered in money awarded or denied.” 53
In his classic study of the budgetary process, Aaron Wildavsky explores the
process from both sides of the equation: those who request the money and those who
authorize and appropriate it. What is of most concern here, however, is his theory of

30

“fair share.” Fair share, according to Wildavsky, “reflects a convergence of expectations
on roughly how much the agency is to receive in comparison to others.” 54 This
expectation, gathered from years of experience influences expectations and requests.
Similarly, after a period of time, there also exists an agreement on an agency’s “base,”
which is the expectation that the budget for the agency will continue at current levels. 55
Thus, the fair share and the base work in conjunction to provide the agency with an
estimate of what it should expect in the budget for the coming year. But there can be
disagreement over what each of these concepts will represent in any given year as current
events may influence beliefs as to the value of the given agency and its actions. 56
What Wildavsky explains, then, is that even though there is general agreement
every year concerning what an agency will receive, a little wiggle room is left for any
adjustments that might be deemed necessary. But how do you place a value on actions or
policies? How does the Congress deem what is valuable and what is not? Some may
argue that public opinion influences representatives and senators in the Congress and that
they will perform according to public will. Gabriel Almond writes: “Popular opinion
may be viewed as ‘latent policy’ and ‘latent politics.’ It not only indicates potential
changes in public policy and the political elite, it is a most significant component of that
public policy and must be understood and appreciated if a proper estimate of the meaning
of that policy is to be made.” 57 Thus, if the public feels compelled to support a particular
program or policy, then it is likely that its budget may be raised in the coming year.
This concept raises two questions: one, what is the mechanism by which public
opinion influences congress and two, the validity of public opinion and the measure of
public opinion. In considering the first question, we must also consider whether public
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opinion influences leaders at all. Jacobs cites quantitative research that finds public
opinion has a significant effect on policy-making yet Jacobs with Lawrence, Shapiro, and
Smith write that the public’s “influence on substantive policy decisions of individual
members is quite modest.” 58 Using a survey of “congressional participants,” Jacobs,
Lawrence, Shapiro, and Smith found that though surveys were paid attention to, they did
not influence congressmen and women quite as much as would be expected for two
reasons: one, perceptions of unreliable surveys and two, “insistence on following their
own convictions.” 59
Addressing the second question, while surveys can be great tools for scholars and
leaders alike, there are many recognized limits to them. They may not be completely
representative of the targeted population or the wording may influence reactions and
answers. Indeed, numbers can be made to appear however one would like them to
appear. Knowing these limits to survey data can certainly impede one’s usage of the
knowledge. If the survey is not representational of the district the congress member
represents, then what is the point of using the knowledge the survey offers?
Years of slow economic growth, fewer dollars being taken in as taxes, and
defense needs can put a great strain on the yearly budget. For instance, in recent years,
the US Congress has had to authorize and appropriate billions of dollars for Hurricane
Katrina recovery and the war on terrorism. With such pressing needs, the discretionary
budget can often become strained. As a result, those funded from discretionary accounts
such as NASA begin to feel the pinch. Thus, while “space exploration is supported as an
ideal… when forced to choose between supporting space and some other social priority,
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the public’s choice is usually to support the other priority as more socially necessary.” 60
It is also generally the Congress’s choice as well.
Decline
Wilson and Schulman both focused on it and as previously discussed, many of the
characteristics associated with it, do not fit in the government sphere. Decline and what
is meant by decline is something that is often neglected throughout the literature on
NASA. A throwaway term, many use it simply to describe the categorization that NASA
is not the agency that it used to be. The problem lies, however, in not properly defining
the term so that its meaning may be at best ambiguous and at worst ill-informed. This
discussion will proceed as follows: first, a review of Downs’s, McCurdy’s, and
Schulman’s conceptualization of decline and second, an examination of the
characteristics of define listed in chapter one and reprinted here.
The Theorists
Downs’s examines decline from the point of view of his life-cycle theory. As the
agency becomes older, it is less capable of being innovative and dynamic. As the agency
ages, its standard operating procedures become hardened, its period of rapid growth is
tempered, and the employee make-up changes. Bureaucracy, the endless paper and
pencil pushing, increases, and changes are harder to make. Downs takes this transition to
be a normal result of age that may damage the agency. Yet in government, paperwork
and bureaucracy are hallmarks of the established bureaucracy. A paper trail and standard
operating procedures are the norm so as to ensure fairness and prevent corruption.
Agencies are created to make operations more standard and predictable so is conservative
really all that bad?
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To relate this to NASA, certainly, the agency has changed from its early days.
Any new agency needs to rapidly expand to create offices and workspaces and employees
to run the agency. At some point growth will inevitably level off and that is not
necessarily bad. A smaller workforce may mean greater efficiency or be a symptom of
falling budget levels for whatever reason. It seems clear from the analysis of NASA’s
history in chapter two that NASA did indeed become more conservative following the
1960s, but it has also attempted to be innovative in recent times, signified by its
acceptance of the Vision for Space Exploration. While Downs admits that some
rejuvenation may be possible for an agency if it undergoes significant periods of growth,
NASA is not going through such a period yet it is taking on new activities.
Related to Downs, McCurdy takes a similar viewpoint on what decline is to mean.
In answering the questions of whether NASA has experience more bureaucracy and/or
conservatism, McCurdy accepts Downs definition of decline: an increasingly
conservative organization characterized by more bureaucracy and conservatism. While
McCurdy’s analysis may have been relevant in the early 1990s when his piece was
written, in light of recent events, it may not be so anymore. Increased budgetary pressure
overall has not led to the Congress rejecting the VSE and conservatism has not led to
NASA rejecting it either. Without an influx of growth, NASA seems to be pursuing a
radical new program under tough budget conditions. None of this situation seems to
mesh well with either Downs or McCurdy.
When Schulman discusses decline, he discusses it in the performance sense or in
other words, that their performance has declined. This varies from the previous
definition of decline in that for Downs and McCurdy the agency declined. Thus, does
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declining performance equal a declining agency? Clearly, what the agency does, how it
performs, is essential to an overall evaluation of agency itself, therefore it must be
considered in conjunction with other factors. Schulman makes a point to note the
“exodus” of personnel from the space program from the 1960s, which left the agency
with a deficit of “imaginative and capable personnel.” 61 As discussed above, this draws
parallels to Downs’s life-cycle theory and makes it all the more evident that Schulman is
analyzing relatively the same thing as Downs.
The point that Schulman attempts to make in this discussion of decline, however,
is that “These space exploration declines- in public support, appropriations, personnel,
morale, organizational structure and performance- all illustrate the fundamental
instability inherent all the nonincremental policy enterprise.” 62 Schulman tries to make
the argument that the support surrounding nonincremental policies fluctuates. If the
support fell so dramatically, though, then why was the space shuttle approved of as a
follow-on program? Indeed, public support for the space agency has been remarkably
consistent over time (though certainly not deep and only as a second tier concern) and
NASA has continued to have money authorized and appropriated for its use. 63 While
already concluding that Downs and Schulman are discussing essentially the same thing, it
should also be clear by this point that Schulman is not describing nonincremental policies
as a whole, but simply the decision to go to the moon. The incredible circumstances
surrounding the moon landing decision including Cold War politics, the launch of
Sputnik, and domestic political concerns are unique characteristics perhaps endemic to
that one period in history. Thus, for Schulman’s argument to be more persuasive, we
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would need to be provided with a greater range and variety of examples of
nonincremental policies.
One other author that has focused on decline specifically in government agencies
is Charles H. Levine. Levine theorizes four causes of what he calls “public organization
decline:” political vulnerability, problem depletion, organizational atrophy, and
environmental atrophy. 64 Levine writes “No organization is immune from these
problems and no organization is likely to be afflicted by them all at once, but a heavy
dose of some of these breakdowns in combination can contribute to an organization’s
decline and even death.” 65 Levine identifies these causes in order to explicate
management schemes that can attempt to reduce or smooth the supposed decline;
Levine’s focus is on managing the organizational change but his four identified causes
can be examined for insights applicable here.
Interestingly enough, when examining political vulnerability, Levine believes that
age is the best predictor of this characteristic. He writes that “Contrary to biological
reasoning, aged organizations are more flexible than young organizations and therefore
rarely die or even shrink much.” 66 This argument is quite different from the ones that we
have examined previously and the only argument he uses to back up this proposition is
that over time, organizations have learned different adaptive abilities. From the evidence
examined previously, I must disagree with Levine. As the organization gets older, it
becomes more established, more situated, firming up its constituency and engraining its
procedures into institutional memory. Therefore, one would think that as the
organization ages, its political vulnerability would decrease. While NASA’s ability to
survive catastrophes and falling budgets may provide evidence for Levine’s argument,
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NASA’s flexibility has been in the details and not the major objective. The main goal
has always been human spaceflight with merely the means being flexible over time.
Moving on to Levine’s second characteristic, problem depletion, this one seems a
bit more plausible. Levine posits that this is the “most familiar” problem for government
organizations; once the political definition of an agency’s mission has run its course or
through a cycle (such as natural disasters or defense), the organization has no more
problems to deal with in the interim. 67 What reason do the organizations that deal with
cyclical problems have to exist in the meantime? Common sense would tell us that they
must prepare and re-supply themselves in between missions or federal disasters. For
example, FEMA in between major disaster declarations in which their help is requested
and/or required must restock, plan, and reexamine what happened in the last event. In
this way, they continue to be prepared for any possible contingency. Since no one knows
when or where FEMA or the military may be needed, they do not cease to exist in the
meantime. Problem depletion therefore does not necessarily equal a decline or
organizational change as Levine argues.
Organizational atrophy most closely resembles the characteristics we will
examine next. Among the list of “management failures” that Levine uses are: weak
oversight, internal atrophy, stifled dissent and upward communication, continuous
reorganization, lack of self-evaluating, and authority with vague responsibility. 68 Any
one of these could be argued to be characteristics influenced by the government as a
whole and inapplicable to any individual agency. For example, weak oversight would be
the fault of the Congress, not of the agency itself. Continuous reorganization will usually
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only happen at the behest of those who oversee agencies after they have identified
problems with the agency.
The final cause of government decline that Levine identifies is environmental
atrophy. Levine says that this occurs “when the capacity of the environment to support
the public organization at prevailing levels of activity erodes.” 69 While not examining
this idea much further than giving some examples, Levine argues that this lack of
resources can significantly reduce what the organization can do, which is only logical.
And as will be explained in the next chapter, is the change in resources that I argue is the
main cause of organizational change.
Levine’s main focus is not on the causes of decline however, but how to manage
for those periods. What Levine neglects, though, is the influence of the rest of the
government on how the agency manages. If an agency can foresee a period of cutbacks,
then without the requisite funds, they may have problems in performing their duties.
With political pressure coming from both executive and legislative branches, the agency
may be forced to do more with less, which causes problems of its own. The agency only
has so much leeway to do as they please, a constraint that plays as much into how the
agency is run as what caused it in the first place.
The Characteristics
In chapter one, the characteristics presented in the following table were briefly
discussed as not being applicable to government agencies. Here, I will go further in
depth about each of these characteristics, which could be described as characteristic of
the decline literature as a whole.
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Table 0-1: Characteristics of Organizational Decline
Characteristics
Increasing conflict
Increasing rigidity
Decreasing morale
Lack of innovation
Elimination of slack resources
Concern with survival
Inability to adapt
Decreasing sales
Decreasing profits
Increasing competition
Decreasing capacity for innovation
Decreasing flexibility
Decreasing number or excess of personnel
Decreasing demand for services
Lack of clear goals
Loss of effective communication
Outdated structure

Sources
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim 1987
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
Weitzel and Jonsson 1989
McCurdy 1991
McCurdy 1991
Whetten 1980; Lorange and Nelson 1987
Whetten 1980
Lorange and Nelson 1987
Lorange and Nelson 1987
Lorange and Nelson 1987

These characteristics can ideally be divided into two different categories, ones
that NASA or the individual agency may or may not have control over directly, and ones
that have to do with the rest of the government. To aid in this analysis, I will employ this
designation.
Government Responsibility
Cameron, Whetten, and Kim succinctly summarize the characteristics of decline
as presented in the literature as such: “Increases in conflict, secrecy, scapegoating, selfprotective behaviors, rigidity, and turnover and decreases in morale, innovativeness,
participation, and long-term planning are among the common problems associated with
decline.” 70 As suitable a place to begin with as any, many of these characteristics are
simply not applicable to government operations. Conflict, when it occurs over policy,
often happens at the top (in the executive branch) and only over the most controversial
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policies. Conflict within an agency, though, may be little to none once the agency has
established itself. From what we have seen previously, government agencies settle into
this repetitive functioning replete with standard operating procedures that are designed to
reduce conflict.
Secrecy and scapegoating may be considered by some to be an epidemic among
the government as a whole. Does the entire government decline then? Secrecy in the
foreign policy or domestic security apparatus may be absolutely essential. Laws such as
the Freedom of Information Act ensure that public records are available. When talking
about people in particular, if something wrong has been done, there is generally a “fall
guy” identified that takes the blame for failed policies. This occurs within government at
a startling pace. But again, does this mean that government as a whole declines? Most
likely, the answer to that question is a no.
NASA certainly cannot be blamed for a lack of innovation. While they are
utilizing thirty plus year old technology now on the space shuttle, NASA has upgraded to
use newer technology on the shuttle and develop new space technologies depending on
its budget. One of the problems that one runs into though, is whether the technology
keeps a pace with the times. If NASA is not innovative enough it could be that the
technology has not changed rapidly enough to allow for it. If technology development is
slow, then it is certainly not NASA’s fault and thus not significant of a decline. The
same could be said to be true for any government research and development agency such
as the National Institutes of Health. Technological change needs to be considered and
lack of not blamed on respective agencies.
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Cameron, Whetten, and Kim also identify an “elimination of slack resources like
contingency accounts, reserves, or new projects” as symptomatic of decline. 71 This at
times may not be at the agency’s choosing; the Congress may well dictate what accounts
get cut, changed, or rolled back. When talking about a government agency, the context in
which it operates must be taken into account and this is one of those times. Criticisms of
the number of field centers that NASA possesses are abundant at times with repeated
cries of redundant operations. Yet these field centers are in no danger of being cut. Once
established, the chances of an agency being dismantled or a field center dissolved are
incredibly slim. Simply by being a government agency, survival is all but guaranteed.
Finally, lack of long-term planning and flexibility is identified as a part of decline.
The essence of NASA’s operations requires long-term planning and in any case, that
long-term planning, the policy-making, is contingent on the executive and the legislative
branches. In many cases it is difficult for either branch to pursue long-term planning,
even in the case of NASA. The budget is never guaranteed every year and circumstances
may develop that prohibit funding agencies at the level that would be required. While
having a long-term budget guaranteed would be nice and beneficial, but as discussed in
chapter two and here in chapter three, it is often difficult to do such.
Agency Responsibility
While they are fewer in number than the characteristics that are affected by the
government as a whole, the following characteristics can often be controlled by the
agency at hand. It should be kept in mind, however, that the government as a whole may
still affect an agency in these matters.
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Higher personnel turnover is an interesting case. In the 1960s, when NASA was,
by most standards, considered to be at the height of its performance, turnover was quite
high. If we go by this characteristic then, NASA in the 1960s would be undergoing a
decline. In actuality, turnover has decreased throughout the decades in NASA at the
same time pronouncements of decline have risen.
Decreasing morale is another characteristic Cameron, Whetten, and Kim identify.
While I know of no comprehensive, government wide survey of satisfaction with
employment, the data provided by McCurdy’s study of NASA employees in the early
1990s provide us with some evidence. But again, enthusiasm for the job may not
necessarily be requisite for a successful agency.
Decreasing sales, profits, and demand for services, and increasing competition,
have little to no applicability for government agencies at all. The bulk, if not all, of them
are run to provide public services, which do not incur costs. As such, no profits and/or
sales are unable to be tracked. Often times, these agencies are the only agencies that
provide a public good or service and experience no competition for them. In particular
relation to NASA, other space agencies both public and private can provide some sort of
competition for launch services but generally, government agencies do not experience
competition for services.
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CHAPTER 3: A BRIEF HISTORY OF NASA, 1970-2005
As noted previously, this brief review of NASA history is designed to fill two
holes in the literature: NASA’s performance and intergovernmental relations beyond the
big decisions and disasters. As such, I will play special attention to these topics in each
of the following sections. I have divided, for ease of discussion, this 35-year period into
seven distinct time periods: (1) post-Apollo and the Shuttle decision, (2) Shuttle
development and early operations, (3) post-Challenger, (4) planning for and
implementing the International Space Station, (5) the 1990s, (6) post-Columbia, and (7)
Constellation.
Post-Apollo and the Shuttle Decision
In order to put the shuttle decision in its proper context, we must go back to the
mid-1960s, before the Apollo program had even gotten off the ground and before the
moon was even within reach. In 1964, President Lyndon Johnson asked NASA for
recommendations as to what the future of America in space should be once the Apollo
program was over. 1 Unfortunately for NASA, in the race to the moon, it had yet to
concern themselves with any sort of follow-on program or mechanism for planning onea criticism that might be seen to haunt the agency to this day. 2 The irony is that at that
time, in 1964, NASA was seen as one of the most progressive, future-forward agencies
involved in the government; yet this same organization neglected to address its future
beyond the current program. With all resources focused squarely on the task at hand, it
appeared difficult for the agency to see anything beyond it.
While the lack of planning for the future continued, the planning for Apollo
continued on. When Apollo 11 reached the moon in July 1969, public enthusiasm for the
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program was already falling; the percent of people who believed that space funding
should be decreased increased dramatically from 5% of the public in 1968 to 56% of the
public in 1975. 3 This created a problem for NASA which, without any sort of follow on
program, would lose all reason for existence. A cascade of other problems evolved from
this very question of survival: thousands of civil servants employed by NASA depended
on it, an industry full of aerospace companies that had been mobilized to support Apollo
were now left without any contracts, and NASA, above all, wanted to “maintain its
bureaucracy and its primacy as a technological organization.” 4 The problem that was
foreseen by one of the earliest supporters of spaceflight, Lyndon Johnson, had come
home to roost before the echoes of the cheers for Apollo 11 had even ended.
In response to this looming crisis, Vice President Spiro Agnew and his Space
Task Group released a report in the summer of 1969 concerning future NASA programs.
While this report put forward numerous proposals for the future, the group could not
agree on a single approach that would recommend itself on its merits. 5 This inconclusive
report was actually a sign of what really was occurring: no one knew what the space
program should do now that it had beaten the Soviets to the moon and won the so-called
Space Race.
NASA’s bureaucratic drive pushed for survival; survival in turn meant that it
would continue to receive the type and amount of funding that it had received for the
previous decade. For NASA, this meant coming up with some type of program involving
human spaceflight, which would require a large amount of funds. But NASA’s drive for
survival did not mesh well with the outside political environment. Public support for the
program dwindled following the moon landings and the Vietnam War was eating up
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more and more of the national budget. Without the willingness of the Congress to fund
and without the money to fund as noted above, NASA would not be able to get what they
absolutely wanted- a brand new program that would provide the funding it was
accustomed to. To counter this, NASA attempted to “rekindle public support” for an
“expansive and expensive” human spaceflight program. 6
Aside from questions concerning funding and public support, there existed very
real questions concerning the need for the US to remain in space. Logsdon writes that
“In 1971, as the debate over whether to approve the space shuttle reached its climax,
NASA Administrator James Fletcher argued to the White House that ‘for the US not be
in space, while others do have men in space, is unthinkable, and it is a position which
America cannot accept.’” 7 But some questioned the very need to have humans in space
at all, something that continues to be relevant today. 8 James Van Allen, the very Van
Allen who discovered radiation belts surrounding the Earth wrote that “Almost all of the
space program’s important advances in scientific knowledge have been accomplished by
hundreds of robotic spacecraft” without the presence of humans. 9
NASA certainly has pursued a number of scientific missions, but at its core, the
pursuit of human spaceflight has colored NASA’s ambitions for its future. 10 As such,
NASA, sensing the political situation, pushed the space shuttle as a suitable follow-on
program that would cost approximately $5.2 billon “less than an expendable alternative
for performing the same mission.” 11 NASA claimed that the shuttle would accomplish
two main objectives: reduce the cost of spaceflight and “provide a future capability
designed to support a wide range of scientific, defense, and commercial use.” 12 Extolling
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its virtues of cost-effectiveness and reusability, NASA claimed that the shuttle would be a
workhorse that would eventually pay for itself. 13
The biggest justification that NASA used for a new program, and in particular the
space shuttle, was that it would be very economical. 14 This judgment would in turn be
supported by a number of factors including a high number of flights by the shuttle and
cost-savings that a reusable system would garner over an expendable launch system. 15
The shuttle would be able to perform a variety of functions in low-Earth orbit including
retrieving and repairing satellites and scientific experiments and launching defense and
commercial payloads. This increased focus on the economic advantages and a wide
variety of uses highlights the changing times. While Apollo did not have to be seen as an
economic or technological benefit, a new program would; a variety of activities for the
shuttle to perform would also give the program a wider base of constituencies and thus a
wider base of support. No longer could NASA rely on public opinion to spur it on or the
space race to give it an edge in the budgetary process.
From all of these constraints, emerged the space shuttle option- a reusable fleet of
space vehicles that would provide cheap and reliable access to space for commercial and
scientific programs. Emerging from Agnew’s Space Task Group and NASA leadership,
the space shuttle seemed to be the only feasible option for NASA. The space shuttle
would attempt to satisfy the requirements of a number of constituencies that would fill
the void of support left by falling public opinion. It could perform commercial
operations such as retrieving, repairing, and releasing satellites and performing valuable
commercial zero-g manufacturing experiments. The DOD would also be able to use the
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shuttles to perform military operations. And science would be aided in the capabilities of
the shuttle to perform and release long-term experiments in space.
Of course, the decision to support the shuttle was a very political decision- Nixon
“did not wish to go down in history as the president who ended the era of man in space”
but this political decision had very real political consequences. 16 Yet, the Vietnam War
was consuming more and more of the national budget and attention with the space
program falling from public favor at the same time. Without due consideration of the
ultimate goals that the country wished to use NASA to achieve, the space shuttle decision
would set the stage for the next thirty-five years. Logsdon traces the basic failure of
national space policy to this shuttle decision: “The reality that national space policy did
not bring ambitions and resources into balance in the 1970s, nor in the subsequent two
decades, is the basic policy failure.” 17
This decision has also led NASA to unduly place all its efforts on the space
shuttle, pushing it to operational status in the 1980s and pushing to keep the program
going in the 1990s. 18 Logsdon is not the only one to fault this decision for many of the
events that would happen years later. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board also
blamed the “compromises hammered out by the White House and NASA headquarters”
for turning NASA into “more of a business, with schedules, production pressures,
deadlines, and cost efficiency goals elevated to the level of technical innovation and
safety goals.” 19
Performance
There is no doubt that NASA lived up to expectations in landing twelve men on
the moon and returning them home safely. Indeed, up until the Apollo 1 fire, there were
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no questions concerning NASA’s performance. Even in the beginning of the 1970s,
these questions had yet to be raised. Yet there are serious questions as to why NASA
pushed the shuttle as hard as it did. Greenberg, in his study of science and politics, offers
one explanation.
In a profession built on numeracy and dedicated to accuracy, what accounts for
these topsy-turvy misstatements of fact? The complaints and the mangling of
financial data without doubt reflected actual distress, principally of a localized
nature: the number of money-seeking scientists was growing faster than the
money. Lacking any real political power… science employed desperate appeals,
in which precision took second place to propaganda. 20
NASA wanted its future, it wanted to survive, and thus it needed guaranteed
funding, which would come in the form of a human spaceflight program. While this
might not be so much a question of performance of an individual program, NASA’s
pushing of the shuttle using reasons that would turn out to be untrue is indicative of the
organization’s performance. It should be noted, though, that the technology involved in
constructing and designing the shuttle was entirely new; predictions of cost effectiveness
and reusability may have been believed within NASA. Actions to cut cost through the
early phases of construction may have been believed to have no effect on the eventual
capabilities of the shuttle. But the overall effect of new technology and budget
constructions led to a program that did not live up to its promises.
NASA should certainly not be singled out for pushing a program that it believed
in; many other agencies and organizations are cheerleaders of plans that they believe are
good or could be successful. But rather than engage in a debate concerning space’s
proper place in US politics and policy, NASA took the easy way out. Knowing the
political environment in which it operated, NASA compromised; rather than recommend
a program that would truly lead to innovation and success such as continuation of the X
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program that led to the development of the X-15, NASA pushed a program that would get
it money and contracts in the short term.
Immediately following the decision to proceed with the space shuttle program,
criticisms of the cost analysis that NASA used to support it began to appear. The General
Accounting Office (GAO, now known as the Government Accountability Office)
produced two reports at the request of Senator Walter Mondale analyzing the cost-benefit
analysis that NASA had produced. In both of these reports, the GAO was highly critical
of the pronouncements of economic viability and the shuttle’s advantages over other
programs. 21 This criticism and suspicion of NASA’s own reports highlights the changing
times that the agency was going through with respect to relations with the legislative and
executive branches. In the 1960s, all it took was presidential support and congressional
appropriations without any good justifications for what NASA would undertake. Now,
Congress did not even trust NASA’s own word for the shuttle’s advantages and were
openly showing suspicion.
Though it was certainly worried, was NASA’s concern for its survival actually
irrational? As has been demonstrated by so many government agencies, once they have
been brought into existence, they very rarely ever get shut down. This would mean that
NASA’s concern for survival existed either because it wrongly perceived that the agency
was on the chopping block or it simply wanted to maintain the current budget. As we
have seen, Nixon would not have ended human spaceflight for a variety of political
reasons including his own legacy and the America’s standing in the world at large. Even
though the Space Race had been won, the standing still had to be maintained. One could
then conclude that NASA was not so much concerned with its survival, as survival was

53

all but guaranteed, but maintaining the funding levels that they had become accustomed
to as human spaceflight was not necessarily guaranteed.
Intragovernmental Relations
NASA’s compromises are clear examples of how NASA negotiated its political
environment. Recognizing the increased funding that the Vietnam War was drawing and
the fall in public opinion, NASA decided to recommend the shuttle, which it believed
would be cost-effective and the minimum that would be required to keep the US in space.
With the fall in public support for the program and the success of the US in the space
race, those in Congress did not feel the same amount of pressure from constituents at
home in the early 1970s for continued US involvement in space as they did in the late
1950s after the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union.
In negotiating the pitfalls of legislative and executive relations, NASA decided to
take the road that would get the most support, regardless of whether it was the right road
or not. With supporters in the aerospace, defense, and commercial industries, NASA did
not have to rely on public opinion and in turn their representatives’ support in the
Congress. While it would ultimately have to be Congress that would appropriate the
money for the program, the pressure from industry would replace the pressure from the
folks at home. Recognizing this political shift, NASA exploited the supposed wide
variety of tasks that the shuttle would be able to perform and its economy.
The Lost Promises of the STS: Shuttle Development and Early Operations
Once the decision to proceed with the space shuttle program had been made,
progress continued into the developmental phases. The program was not even three years
old when problems began to creep up. In a report from the GAO in 1975, NASA was
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already experiencing delays of up to a year, rising costs, and falling budgets. 22 Just a
year later, in 1976, another GAO report identified continuing issues with the program
including increased development time, less testing, and falling contingency reserves for
the agency. 23
As the development problems increased, the economic justifications for the
program became increasingly uncertain. The same 1976 GAO report indicated that for
the economic justifications to be valid, NASA would require a stable budget of $3.3
billion in 1972 dollars. 24 A relatively stable and predictable budget level is never a
guarantee for any government agency and this unpredictability coupled with higher
development costs and lower expectations for the shuttle combined together to put in
doubt the original economic justification for the shuttle and put the program at higher
risk. 25
What is also interesting about the shuttle justification and developmental phase is
the participation of the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD had committed (over
the objections of the Air Force) to using the shuttle for all of its military payloads once
the shuttle had reached operational status and proven all of its capabilities. 26 Among the
reasons stated for this reliance include: reduced launch costs, improved payload
reliability, and phase-out of expendable launch vehicles and their various launch
complexes. 27 While dependence on the shuttle would no doubt be cost-effective for the
military, it is only cost-effective if and when the shuttle reaches its performance and
operational goals. Further, there was no guarantee of a specific number of payloads from
the DOD and those that would be required would need to get into geosynchronous orbit
from the low-Earth orbit achieved by the shuttle.
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The requirement of geosynchronous orbit would either require an additional
booster on shuttle that would allow it to reach the higher orbit or what would be termed a
“space tug.” This space tug would provide an additional reusable propulsion system that
could place payloads in the higher orbit. By 1976, the space tug had been delayed until
late 1985, which would leave the military with a gap of approximately 4-5 years until
which payloads could be placed in a higher orbit. 28
Additionally, DOD’s reliance on the space shuttle would lead to a major
consequence that would be unseen until Challenger in 1986. With the shuttle reaching
operational status, the military’s stock of expendable launch vehicles was being phased
out. When the shuttle Challenger exploded 51 seconds into its mission, it meant a
temporary stop in all shuttle launches until the cause of failure could be determined and
changes made to the program. This effectively left the DOD with no launch options of its
payloads for some time. As we will see further down, the DOD would abandon its
commitment to the shuttle program following Challenger highly damaging the already
fragile program.
Another aspect of DOD participation was the possibility of the military buying
two orbiters that would be refurbished from testing status. The purchase would ensure
the military a platform from which to launch its payloads but it also brings to light many
questions concerning military involvement in a civilian agency. Indeed, these questions
have haunted NASA before there even was a NASA. Dwight Eisenhower’s concerns
about military control of a space program eventually led him to conclude that a civilian
agency would be the most appropriate venue to pursue space exploration. But as we have
seen, with NASA’s needs of a wide constituency base, it was almost forced to view the
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DOD as a partner in human spaceflight from the beginning. With the defense industry
and the DOD behind it, NASA hoped to make up for lost popular support in the
Congress.
Table 0-1: Space Shuttle Projected versus Actual
Space Shuttle Features
Projected
Actual
Shuttle Design,
$5.15 billion
$5.67 billion
Development, Test, and
Evaluation
Number of Orbiters
5
4
Production Cost of Orbiters
$1 billion
$2.64 billion
Number of Flights, through
581
38 plus 5 test flights
1990
Cost per Flight
$10.45 million
$750 million
All budget figures in 1971 dollars
Sources: GAO: Space Transportation System, February 1975, pg. 2
NASA Historical Data Book Vol. 5, pg. 260
NASA Historical Data Book Vol. 3, tables 2-24, 2-29
Space.com. <http://www.space.com/news/shuttle_cost_050211.html>.

In 1982, the space shuttle officially became operational. It was not without its
problems, however. Only two orbiters were in use, per flight costs were still highly over
budget, and turn-around times for orbiters between flights were astronomical compared to
the original planned estimate. For example, in 1983, five fully operational flights were
planned at a cost of $266 million each and projected turn-around times by the 26th flight
was expected to be 888 man-hours as compared to NASA’s goal of 160 hours. 29 This
combination of higher cost per flight and fewer flights would put into doubt the original
projections of the project just as it had become operational.
With the shuttle pushed to operational status, the question also arose of who
would operate the space shuttle program. Since Project Mercury, the original human
spaceflight program, NASA had always had the responsibility to develop and operate
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manned spaceflight missions. Yet the human spaceflight programs of the 1960s never
had as their stated goals, low-cost and reliable human spaceflight. If sending humans into
space was to be made reliable and operational, the question arose as to whether NASA,
an agency focused primarily on research and development, should operate it. 30
As demonstrated by Challenger and Columbia, the job of putting humans into
space using the shuttle will never be made into the reliable system that many had hoped
for. Placing responsibility for systems like weather satellites, COMSAT (a
communications satellite system) and LANDSAT does make operational sense but these
systems do not involve placing human lives at risk. Even though a system is operational
does not mean that the risk is 100% gone.
Performance
Again, NASA experienced a number of performance issues in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. These issues were not so much evident in specific programs living or not
living up to their goals, but overall agency operations. Two major problems will be
addressed here: NASA cost-estimates and early shuttle capabilities. These two issues are
intertwined, but will be examined in turn.
NASA’s cost-estimates for the shuttle program beginning with their initial
estimates in 1971 were shown to be grossly off track. In each of the GAO reports on the
shuttle that I have examined, the GAO consistently criticizes NASA’s cost-estimating
and budgeting processes. In its 1976 report on the shuttle program’s progress, the GAO
reported that NASA had failed to include in-house development costs for the shuttle and
its components, “changes in the shuttle’s development plan have reduced the probability
of meeting cost and performance goals,” and “the innovative design and refurbishment
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techniques which account for much of the projected payload savings are controversial
issues.” 31 It appears from the report’s findings that NASA left some costs of
development out so as to make the projected cost of the program appear lower. Again,
we face the question of whether NASA did this simply to survive or to increase its yearly
budget intake. Clearly, not including all applicable costs in the program’s cost, can work
both ways for NASA. By making the total cost appear lower, the program looks more
attractive and more economical. But, as actual costs have shown, by intentionally
keeping the projected budget lower, NASA left less room for error in the development
phase.
This intentional lowering of projected costs not only left NASA little room for
technical problems but also led to cutting the shuttle’s capabilities. The GAO noted that
this led to two questions: one, will the goals initially set for the shuttle be met and two,
“how much development can be eliminated and still keep a viable program.” 32 The same
report went on to criticize this approach of deletion of program elements by stating: “In
addition, past experience with major civil and defense acquisitions has shown that
NASA’s development approach can lead to costly retrofit or redesign at a later date or to
deploying systems that cannot adequately fulfill their intended role.” 33
The situation foreseen by the GAO in 1976 eventually came to pass once the
shuttle became operational in 1982. The true cost of the design deletions would be seen
in the increased costs per launch and fewer launches. It is interesting to contemplate
what might have happened had NASA included all possible costs in its original estimates
and included all planned elements of the system. Perhaps the shuttle might have met its
original stated goals after all or been cancelled because of the huge costs.
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Intragovernmental Relations
In the years comprising the development, testing, and operations of the space
shuttle, the number of GAO reports concerning the agency increased to a high of ten in
1977 (for a complete content analysis of GAO reports concerning NASA between 1970
and 2005, see Appendix I). This increased interest on the part of the Congress, whose
members routinely request these reports, demonstrates the increased oversight that NASA
was experiencing. Unlike the 1960s when NASA had a fairly wide range of freedom to
conduct its operations without much oversight and with a blank check signed by
Congress, the newest generation of human spaceflight experienced much more
congressional oversight.
With less pressure from constituents at home, the Congress did not have as much
pressure to completely fund a space program. Between 1972 and 1982, the General
Social Survey found that 74% of people asked about the amount of money being spent on
the space program responded that it was “about right” or “too much.” 34 The 1970s
actually saw the cooperation of the US and the Soviet Union in space in the form of the
Apollo-Soyuz test program. The space race and its money was over and NASA was now
experiencing what most government agencies experience- the normal budgetary process.
What is interesting about the 1970s, however, is the lack of involvement in the space
program by the executive branch, namely the president. Once Nixon had made the
decision to go with the space shuttle, the presidents of that decade had very little to do
with the program. While NASA worked with the Office of Management and Budget (an
executive agency) on various budgets, direct involvement with the Oval Office was very
little.
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Challenger
The long simmering doubts about the abilities of the space shuttle would come to
a sudden head on January 28, 1986. Just moments into its flight, the shuttle Challenger
disintegrated when an o-ring in one of its boosters failed bringing the shuttle program to a
halt. While the faulty o-ring would eventually be deemed the cause of the disaster, the
accident review board examining Challenger and other analysts would find many more
systemic problems that had led up to it.
Once declared fully operational, the space shuttle program was still not meeting
the benchmarks that had been set out for it. As discussed above, the low-cost estimates
and even lower budgets had led to disastrous cuts from the program and an orbiter that
did not have all the features promised. Because of this, turn-around time for the orbiters
in between missions did not get anywhere near the target of 160-hours that would have
made possible the 25+ plus flights a year that would in turn have made the program
economical. This combination of problems would place much pressure on NASA to push
the shuttles more to meet their performance targets.
Among the pressures felt by NASA was a push to get more shuttle flights in with
less money, with better results; quicker, better, cheaper. In this sense, NASA was forced
to operate more like a business with deadlines and budgets rather than the research and
development agency it was designed to be. Once again, the consequences of NASA’s
actions in the 1970s caught up with them. The Rogers Commission, the board that
investigated the Challenger accident, stated that costs of individual shuttle components
were the primary consideration used by NASA to select contractors for the program. 35
The implicit suggestion made by the commission, then, is that NASA sacrificed safety for

61

cost in the early stages of the program, which is consistent with what has already been
described.
In short, NASA’s own actions, or lack thereof, in support of the belief that the
shuttle would make human spaceflight more reliable and cost-effective were a major
cause of Challenger. The Rogers Commission noted the increased acceleration of shuttle
flights with less resources available to crew and support staff as a critical cause of the
accident. 36 NASA had set the standards for the shuttle program so high that in the end, it
did not have the requisite resources to achieve those standards. Why were these
standards set so unrealistically high? Clearly, part of the explanation is that the shuttle
represented new and untested technology and without knowledge of what exactly it could
do, the shuttle flight estimates were optimistic. But perhaps there is a more political
aspect to this explanation; NASA needed to show the Congress a program that would
make economical sense and the only way to do that was to set the flight standard
incredibly high. Of course, the individual blame for Challenger is not relegated solely to
this decision, but as the Rogers Commission explained, it was an accident with a history.
A major criticism that was made in the wake of Challenger, and also after
Columbia, was that NASA’s own culture played a role in the incident. When speaking of
culture, it is considered the way that the agency does things. 37 In McCurdy’s history of
NASA culture Inside NASA, this change in the way that NASA operates is detailed from
the 1960s through the 1990s. In short, what has been shown is that NASA’s technical
culture with its deference to engineers and the engineering culture had been greatly worn
away with age. In the early NASA, “the normalization of risk, the acceptance of failure
and the anticipation of trouble led to an atmosphere in which these things could be
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discussed openly. NASA’s ability to handle risk required open discussions in which midlevel managers and engineers felt unrestrained in voicing warnings and dissent.” 38 With
age, NASA began to formalize its operations and increase the level of bureaucratization,
institutionalizing methods and procedures for various occurrences thus stifling this early
atmosphere of cooperation and acceptance of all the aspects of the challenge of sending
humans into space. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board sums this problem up
nicely showing that the lesson was not fully learned: “NASA’s Apollo-era research and
development culture and its prized deference to the technical expertise of its working
engineers was overridden in the space shuttle era by ‘bureaucratic accountability’- an
allegiance to hierarchy, procedure, and following the chain of command. Prior to
Challenger, the can-do culture was a result not just of years of apparently successful
launches, but of the cultural belief that the shuttle program’s many structures, rigorous
procedures, and detailed system of rules were responsible for those successes” and
failures. 39
It was not only this formal bureaucracy that contributed to change in NASA
culture but also the failures it had experienced including the Apollo 1 fire. In response to
various failures, NASA became more conservative, “more concerned with not making
mistakes, and less tolerant of intuitive decisions.” 40 Agencies such as NASA that are
funded with discretionary money by the US Congress cannot afford to be seen as a failing
agency either; in that case, they risk losing the very funding that could make them
successful. 41 With NASA already taking on the criticism that the shuttle had failed to
live up to expectations, the pressure was on to get the shuttle operating more effectively

63

and more efficiently. As a result, concerns about the o-ring that caused the death of the
seven crewmembers were stifled.
Challenger also led to some very practical effects for NASA and the space
community as a whole. Because the Department of Defense was to have relied upon the
shuttle for all of its launching needs, plans had been drawn up by NASA and the DOD to
effectively shut down the production of expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) which could
have, posed a threat as a cheaper launch alternative to the shuttle. With the temporary
grounding of the orbiter fleet until Challenger was fully investigated, the DOD was left
with no launch options for its payloads. Thus, the decision was made to keep ELVs in
service as a launch option for the military and private companies. This effectively meant
the end of DOD participation in the shuttle program as it never purchased the two orbiters
that it had all but committed to.
So it was that Challenger confirmed the growing suspicions that the shuttle would
not and could not live up to its promises. Why stick with the program then? At the time,
there were calls for the program to be ended but the big aerospace companies with their
lobbying power, actually pushed the Congress to give NASA more funds with which to
build another orbiter to replace Challenger. It was also at this time that the International
Space Station (called Space Station Freedom then) was in early development. The space
station would eventually need to be hauled into space piece by piece by the space shuttle,
which would not only give the shuttle a purpose but also enable Americans to have a
space station comparable to the Soviet Union’s Mir.
More abstractly, however, the US has established a tradition of surviving disaster
and coming back from it. Following the Apollo 1 fire, the race to the moon did not stop,
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but continued on. The same thing has happened following Challenger and Columbia. In
the wake of disasters, Americans exhibit this determination to continue no matter the
costs and do it better than the last time. President Ronald Reagan, who was to have given
his State of the Union address the night of the Challenger accident, addressed the nation
instead that night. His words are instructive:
The future doesn’t belong to the fainthearted; it belongs to the brave. The
Challenger crew was pulling us into the future, and we’ll continue to follow
them…. We’ll continue our quest in space. There will be more shuttle flights and
more shuttle crews and, yes, more volunteers, more civilians, and more teachers
in space. Nothing ends here; our hopes and our journeys continue. 42
President George W. Bush echoed these same sentiments following the Columbia
accident in 2003 but it is interesting to note that, while perhaps not the main cause of
continuing on with the shuttle program following Challenger, that this sentiment of
“going on with the mission” and “continuing on” might have played a small role.
Performance
Clearly, Challenger was not the high point of NASA’s performance record. In
the wake of the accident, the first major criticisms of NASA’s performance began to
creep up, however. Calls for NASA to be restructured or the space program to be ended
completely were roundly heard. The consequences of NASA’s decisions in the shuttle
development phase were bound out to their conclusion.
If any good was to have come out of this, it was perhaps the lowering of shuttle
standards to more realistic expectations. By this time, no one in government or NASA
was seeing the program through rose-colored glasses; flights per year were never going to
meet the goal of 25, shuttle refurbishment between flights was going to take longer, and
the program was going to cost more and need more resources. In bringing the standards
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for the program into a more realistic light, Challenger not only highlighted problems of
performance for NASA but also lowered future standards for performance.
Intragovernmental Relations
In 1967 following the launch pad fire of Apollo 1 during routine testing, NASA
was allowed with very little interference to conduct their own investigation into the
accident. That was not the case following Challenger. President Reagan established a
commission, formally entitled the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, better known as the Rogers Commission, to investigate the causes
of the break up of Challenger. The commission identified the mechanical failure, the oring that directly caused the accident but also spent four chapters examining contributing
causes to Challenger. As discussed above, they criticized the very decision-making
processes that allowed Challenger to launch stating, “If the decision makers had known
all of the facts, it is highly unlikely that they would have decided to launch.” 43
That NASA was not allowed to conduct its own investigation is the obvious sign
of the times that demonstrated NASA’s fallen stance in respect to governmental relations.
Clearly, if NASA could not be trusted to live up to the standards that had been set for the
shuttle program to begin with, it could not be trusted to fully investigate what had went
wrong. Further, NASA would not have been in a position to identify and critique the
very decision-making processes and policies that the Rogers Commission identified as
contributing to the accident. While having this criticism leveled at them certainly could
not have been comfortable, it could have saved lives in the end by allowing NASA to
change these dangerous processes.
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The International Space Station
Even before Challenger and the concerns that it raised, NASA was pushing for a
new program, fresh on the heels of declaring the shuttle operational. A space station,
originating in the 1969 task force report, in low-Earth orbit that would be serviced by the
shuttle was argued to be the next step in America’s space program. Nominally argued for
since the 1950s, many people inside NASA, and out, believed that a space station would
be a stepping-stone to going back to the moon and onto other worlds. But NASA,
sensing that releasing satellites into space would not give the shuttle enough to do,
pushed the space station to give the shuttle something to do. 44 In fact, the space station
became the next logical step. 45
Putting a continuous American human presence into space also gave NASA a
chance to regain the popular support that was once again viewing space flight as a routine
and normal operation. 46 Indeed, NASA’s own pronouncements that it could make
regular, routine access to space for humans into a cost-efficient affair came to work
against NASA. Following the initial spectacular launches of the space shuttle, public
attention to the program waned; perhaps if NASA could launch another program, another
spectacle, it could continue to draw the public’s attention to its activities.
Of course, giving the shuttle something to do and regaining public attention were
not the only reasons that NASA pushed the space station. The Soviet Union had placed a
series of space stations into orbit beginning in the 1970s and was preparing to launch its
most successful space station, Mir. Though the Cold War did not give NASA as big of a
rationale to pursue big expensive projects as it did in the 1960s, the space station still
came to be “defined by its political rationale.” 47 If the Soviets were doing it, then the US
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had to do it as well. Ironically, however, the former Soviet Union would come to play an
important part in the eventual International Space Station.
In order to get approval for such an expansive project, NASA would have to take
the plans to the president, Ronald Reagan. A Cold Warrior, Reagan was also concerned
about the economics of the program, particularly coming off of the non-economical space
shuttle program. NASA in turn convinced Reagan of the space station’s commercial
possibilities- zero-gravity manufacturing, the promise of the new drugs developed in
lower gravity, and other possible commercial ventures. Klerkx recounts that “When
Reagan approved the project now known as the International Space Station, commerce- if
not outright profit- was high on the list of his motivations for doing so; in fact, had
NASA not convinced Reagan that industrial suitors interested in lucrative microgravity
research and manufacturing could eventually turn the station into a for-profit enterprise, it
probably wouldn’t have been built.” 48 Greenberg seems to confirm this by arguing
“Reagan began his presidency with announced plans to reduce the government’s civilian
budget, including research, by substantial amounts.” 49 That we should see Reagan go
ahead and endorse an expensive space project after announcing his intention to cut the
budget demonstrates the apparent strength of the economic arguments that NASA used in
justifying the space station and Reagan’s enthusiasm for space overall.
When Reagan finally approved the space station known as Freedom, the long
process of development and design began. Much like the space shuttle, various designs
and options were examined all while the costs of the program skyrocketed- a total of
seven project redesigns with a reduced budget to just over a billion dollars. 50 With NASA
suffering from the aftermath of Challenger and repeated budget cuts to the space station
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budget, it would be 1988 until a “final” design of the space station would be approved.
This final design would be short-lived however, as a confluence of events came together
to change the future of Space Station Freedom.
In 1990, the space station was found to be too heavy and too complicated to
construct. 51 With it costing more and more money and the budget for the space station
continually underestimated by NASA, the program became dangerously close to being
cut altogether by the Congress. The Congress would hold a vote in 1993 on whether to
continue the program- it came within one vote of being shut down. 52 Thus NASA was
forced to come up with an incredibly scaled down project that eliminated many of the
science aspects of the original space station that still cost more than what was expected.
At the same time, the former Soviet Union was falling apart and concerns began
to be raised about their space program and their scientists. With no guarantee of income
or a job, there was a danger that these scientists would go on to work with groups or
countries and give them valuable knowledge concerning nuclear weapons. As a result,
the US invited Russia to become a major partner in the International Space Station (ISS)
thus ensuring their scientists jobs and their economy money. The space station that had
originally begun as a counter to the Soviet Union’s Mir now had the cooperation of
Russia with much of the original rationale for the space station disappearing.
Performance
Once again, NASA’s performance has come into question not because of failing
to reach performance objectives but because of what they did to get approval for their
projects. Some may proclaim NASA has literally lied to not only the president but also
the Congress in order to get the space station approved, but perhaps it was more of a
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question of good intentions with bad results. NASA personnel may have truly believed
that the space station could be designed and constructed with a relatively small budget
and that it would eventually turn a profit, but the experience with the space shuttle should
have been a lesson. Technology does not often grow at the pace that other people want it
to grow at and, as had been learned with other government acquisition projects, as stated
before, the budgets are often higher than projected.
Certainly, the budget that was continually lowered by the Congress for the space
station project played a role in the constant redesigns that consequently cost more. On
the other hand, however, if NASA had given an estimate that was higher for the space
station that could have been closer to the actual cost, the program might never have
gotten off the ground. To NASA’s credit, it was between a rock and the rest of the
government; NASA needed to give the space shuttle something else to do and wanted to
continue its presence in space. Human spaceflight was what brought the largest
percentage of money into the agency and by continually flying humans into space, NASA
could guarantee itself a certain amount of money every year. Beside the conscious
decision to remain in low-Earth orbit with the space shuttle and the space station, some
within NASA thought that the space station could serve as a middle ground between
Earth and the rest of our solar system- it would eventually turn into a jumping off point
for missions to Mars. But good intentions often have bad outcomes as the space station
and the space shuttle have shown.
That NASA did not learn from its mistakes is an example of two characteristics of
NASA: it is hardheaded, determined to get its own way, it pursues a specific vision of its
own, and is willing to use its power, but also that the agency strove to continue a human
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presence in space and follow the ideal of continuing discoveries and journeys into space.
It is this “real” and “ideal” NASA that many have often commented about, including
renowned physicist Freeman Dyson. 53 The ideal NASA still holds on to the dreams of
moving further and further out into space but the real NASA is still destined to remain in
low-Earth orbit because of its emphasis on survival and greater budgets. The tension
between these two ideals remains and perhaps a winning side will never be decided upon.
Intragovernmental Relations
There are two highlights of NASA’s intergovernmental relations during this
period: getting presidential approval for the space station program and increasing
congressional oversight over the program. In the course of persuading Reagan to approve
the space station, NASA utilized a number of reasons including: commercial
applications, the Cold War, and that it was the next logical step. When NASA referred to
the space station as the next logical step, they were really saying that now that we have a
space shuttle, it needs to do something (build a space station) and that that space station
would serve as a way station for further exploration. Reagan, being perhaps the
consummate Cold Warrior, accepted these rationales and NASA explanations and
approved the program in 1984.
That NASA could convince Reagan to support the program using almost the same
rationales as they used for the space shuttle program is intriguing. Obviously NASA
claims that the shuttle could be cost-efficient, reliable, and provide routine access into
space were coming to naught at that time. How could Reagan trust NASA with another
multi-billion dollar program that it claimed would be economical and provide constant
US access in space? This event provides an unmistakable indication of the amount of
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power that NASA still wielded even though the space shuttle program was
underperforming compared to its stated objectives.
But not all in government were convinced by NASA’s claims for the space
station. Just as we saw in the late 1970s, the number of General Accounting Office
(GAO) reports concerning NASA increased from just two in 1986 to 38 in 1992 at the
height of the discussions concerning the space station. Congress was certainly utilizing
their oversight powers and not just in investigating the agency either. A number of votes
were held in the early 1990s concerning the future of the program with the closest the
program came to being killed being one vote. The amount of oversight that Congress
took with the space station, however, Greenberg finds to be the norm- the program was
constantly criticized and chastised yet still survived. 54
The 1990s: A Reemergence of Space, a Reemergence of NASA
While the events of the 1960s did not truly play themselves out all over again in
the 1990s, the memories were brought back out in the form of popular culture. The 1990s
became the first decade since the existence of NASA that brought no new major human
spaceflight program. Instead, the International Space Station finally got off the ground
and the space shuttle inched closer to achieving its goal of at least, reliable access to
space.
The 1990s began with the replacement shuttle Endeavour coming into service
following the Challenger disaster. Endeavour was approved in 1987 as a replacement for
the lost orbiter and was built at a cost of over $2 billion dollars. Marking the end of a
long recovery period from NASA’s first loss of a crew during an actual mission,
Endeavour flew its first flight in 1992.
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Another significant characteristic of the decade for NASA was the long and stable
leadership of Dan Goldin as administrator of NASA. Pioneering the “faster, better,
cheaper” trend that had been evident for some time now, Goldin made extensive
personnel cuts, reduced the time spent designing new science missions, and lowered
budget estimates submitted to the Congress. 55 Goldin serveed as NASA administrator
through a total of three presidential administrations, from 1992-2001.
It was not only stable leadership, the space shuttle program’s recovery from
Challenger, and the headway made with the International Space Station that led to a
greater awareness of NASA and its programs during the 1990s. Nor was it a big
presidential announcement of a new space program. The release of the film “Apollo 13”
in 1995 and the HBO miniseries “From the Earth to the Moon” in 1998 marked a new
interest in the space program. In his study of public opinion and NASA, Launius found
that “These images from popular culture, coupled with real world accomplishments in
spaceflight, work together to create powerful visions affecting the public
consciousness.” 56 Launius found that until 1995, public opinion polls concluded that a
majority of the American public favored robotic space exploration over human
exploration of space. 57 He traces the change to not only the ensuing Mir/Shuttle
missions, but to the release of “Apollo 13” and other “near-term science fiction films.” 58
Along with the film “Apollo 13,” two other movies released in the 1990s served
to reignite public interest in the space program: “Armageddon” and “Deep Impact,” both
released in 1998. “Armageddon,” a film in which a fictitious asteroid is on a collision
course with Earth is notable for the significant involvement of NASA both in real life and
in the movie. In the movie, NASA is clearly portrayed throughout as the agency that
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spearheads the effort to blow the asteroid up so that it does not hit the Earth. NASA
provides a new class of shuttle for the mission and trains the crews for the mission; Billy
Bob Thornton plays a NASA mission manager with a critical role on Earth during the
mission. NASA also participated in the filming of the movie with giving technical advice
(though the film is still technically inaccurate).
“Deep Impact” does not have the focus on NASA that “Armageddon” has. The
film’s subplot involves a crew sent to the comet that is due to hit the Earth, but the major
plotlines have more to do with the effects on individual people on Earth knowing that a
comet is on its way to destroy their home and possibly their lives. The combination of
these two movies, however, served to stimulate an interest in Near Earth Objects (NEOs)
that could possibly collide with the Earth and NASA’s efforts to stop them. While
NASA does have an NEO program, it has recently been decried as utterly under funded.
Real life events also helped to heighten public interest in the program. On July 4,
1997, the first successful Mars rover landed on the red planet and beamed pictures back
to Earth. Taking place on America’s Independence Day, Sojourner was released by the
Mars Pathfinder and provided stunning pictures of Mars that had never been seen before.
Following the success of Sojourner, two more rovers would be sent to Mars in 2003 that
would be equally successful. With the combination of sometimes fantastic and
sometimes partially truthful docudramas and the successful Mars missions, the percent of
people who believed NASA’s performance to be either excellent or good rose from 46%
in July 1990 to a decade high of 76% in November 1998. 59
But successes notwithstanding, NASA’s scientific exploration of Mars would
indeed suffer from some very public disasters. The Mars Climate Orbiter was destroyed
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as it attempted to enter into orbit around Mars in 1998. The orbiter suffered its fatal error
because of a measurement mix-up by contractor Lockheed Martin. Coming closely on
the heels of the successful Sojourner mission, most had expected this mission to be
equally successful; with such high hopes for success, its failure was all the more
deafening.
Aside from the science mission failures, the human spaceflight program seemed
to have gotten its pitfalls behind them. After years of delays on the part of both America
and Russia, the first module of the ISS was placed into orbit in 1998. Following the
addition of two more modules, the beginning of a continual human presence on the ISS
began in 2000. Giving the Russians “a steady paycheck” for their involvement in the ISS
also seemed to be helping the recovering Russia. 60 Yet at the same time, some within
NASA were concerned with Russia’s continuing operations on the space station Mir. 61
Russia’s attempt at creating modules for the ISS and continuing operations on Mir was
delaying the ISS and continually infuriating America and the other partners in the project.
As a result, NASA pressured the Russians to deorbit Mir so that they could focus on the
ISS. A very political decision indeed, some wondered whether NASA felt that its ISS
was threatened by having another space station nearby already. Why spend all this
money on designing, building, and constructing in orbit a brand new space station when
one was already there? Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, routine human spaceflight
seemed all the more reliable and had a purpose- construct the International Space Station.
Performance
Of all the time periods examined here, it could be argued that during the 1990s,
NASA’s performance increased greatly. With no major mishaps or deaths and no new
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scandals over under priced programs, NASA seemed to be well on its way to “faster,
better, cheaper.” Indeed, the number of reports concerning NASA during the 1990s
continually dropped throughout the decade to a low of seven in 1998. Public opinion was
warming back up to the program and many thought that the worst was behind them.
But all is never as well as it initially appears and the same is true of NASA.
During the 1990s, NASA attempted developing several vehicles that eventually replaced
the space shuttle yet none of these programs ever came to fruition. The GAO
acknowledged this saying that “Despite many successes in the exploration of space, such
as landing the Pathfinder and Exploration Rovers on Mars, NASA has had difficulty
bringing a number of projects to completion, including several efforts to build a second
generation reusable human spaceflight vehicle to replace the space shuttle.” 62 Part of the
problem with these programs is that, outside of the International Space Station, the future
goals and requirements for US human spaceflight was unknown and had never really
been debated; thus, it was unclear ”what kind of ‘post-Shuttle’ vehicle to develop.” 63
While not a failure of a major program, the failure of NASA to be able to develop the
next generation of space transportation system after the shuttle had been in operation
almost twenty years could be considered a failure of planning.
Intragovernmental Relations
With no new human spaceflight program during the 1990s, then-President Bill
Clinton really had very little interaction with the space agency. In contrast, however,
relations with the Congress were improving. Dan Goldin’s focus on cutting the budget
and streamlining the agency and imposed congressional budget ceilings on the
International Space Station helped to keep budget costs for the space station under
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control. And with no one under any illusion that the space shuttle would be economical,
budget quarrels over that program were few and far between. NASA even played a
critical foreign policy role following the break-up of the Soviet Union, giving the
Russians funding and something to do. As mentioned previously, the number of reports
concerning the space program generated by the GAO consistently fell throughout the
decade and increased public interest in the agency helped to alleviate support problems in
the Congress.
While the number of GAO reports on NASA did indeed decrease, the GAO’s
criticism of the agency did not. Beginning in 1990, the GAO “identified NASA’s
contract management as a high-risk area.” 64 NASA’s cost-estimating procedures, though
a problem since the 1970s, became a major problem for them in the 1990s. The GAO
derided NASA not only for terrible cost-estimates but also for the bad program
management that stemmed from that.
Columbia
The progress that NASA made through the 1990s with respect to the space shuttle
and International Space Station programs was not destined to last into the new
millennium. On February 1, 2003, returning from a two-week flight to the International
Space Station, disintegrated over Texas upon reentry. The eventual technical fault was
found to be a foam strike on the left wing during lift-off from the Kennedy Space Center
in Florida. While some within NASA were concerned about possible damage from the
debris strike, the concerns were eventually waved off.
Similar to the aftermath of Challenger, the accident put the shuttle fleet on an
immediate grounding and sent the space agency scrambling to find the cause. And just
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like Challenger, many of the causes would be found within NASA itself. The Columbia
Accident Investigation Board, or CAIB, was the counterpart to the Rogers Commission
for Columbia. It found that, in addition to the technical flaws and “In response to White
House and Congressional mandates, NASA leaders took actions that created systematic
organizational flaws at the time of Challenger that were also present for Columbia.” 65
For many, these “flaws” are questions of culture, or rather NASA’s way of
operating. The same questions that arose following Challenger crept up in Columbia’s
wake. Over 15 years had passed between the two accidents, yet NASA was still pushing
a tight schedule of launches due to the construction of the ISS. Following years of
delays, progress was finally being consistently made on getting the ISS into orbit and
constructed. As a result, the shuttle launch schedule was pushed to its breaking point.
The GAO noted that “Columbia’s safety was compromised in part by the shuttle
program’s fluctuating priorities and arbitrary schedule pressures to achieve certain space
station milestones.” 66 This comment is noteworthy since the fact that the shuttle launch
schedule was deemed to be “arbitrary” reinforces the blame that should be placed on
NASA. In 1986, NASA was pushing the shuttle in order to demonstrate that it achieved
the cost efficiency benefits that had been proclaimed yet since then, those claims have
been proven wholly false. Therefore, in 2003, the shuttle schedule was completely
arbitrary; knowing that it would never be cost-effective, NASA personnel could have
taken the time to ensure safety and a reliable orbiter yet they were continually be pushed
to get the space station constructed to the point of neglecting the possibility of increased
safety in the form of a shuttle replacement.
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Similar to the Rogers Commission’s finding of blame in NASA’s culture, the
CAIB found that “NASA’s culture of bureaucratic accountability emphasized chain of
command, procedure, following the rules, and going by the book. While rules and
procedures were essential for coordination, they had an unintended negative effect.
Allegiance to hierarchy and procedure had replace deference to NASA engineers’
technical expertise.” 67 This very familiar conclusion leads to an eerie train of thoughthad the lessons concerning culture and safety been fully implemented following
Challenger, could Columbia have been avoided? Perhaps time had eroded the value of
the lessons; as we get further and further away from 1986, people get more and more
confident in those same systems and procedures. Lessons get lost, memories become
fuzzy, and accidents happen.
Columbia not only led to questions of culture but also to the topic of the aging
shuttles. While various programs, most notably the DC-X and X-33 programs, had been
trying to develop replacements for the space shuttle, most went over budget and/or were
cancelled for various reasons. The promising X-33 program was cancelled in 2001 in
deference to the new Space Launch Initiative, which would in turn be cancelled just prior
to Columbia. 68 Questions concerning what to do with the shuttle had lingered for years;
by 2000, the technology was already almost 25 years old. But the same question that was
not asked following Apollo was still not being asked at the beginning of the 21st centurywhat does America want out of its space program? Without answers to that very
fundamental questions, appropriate programs cannot be designed and pursued. Again,
CAIB found this question to be very elemental- without answers as to what the nation
wants, NASA is not funded properly and thus strives “to do too much with too little.” 69
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These familiar echoes of Challenger turned into deafening roars following
Columbia. And like the aftermath in 1986, the push to continue exploration of space had
been heard from not only the president, but the congress as well. That NASA had a
future was all but written in stone, but what would that future hold?
Performance
Clearly, Columbia was not NASA’s best moment. While the criticisms levied
following Challenger were quite direct and alarming, that NASA allowed the same
problems to creep up once again is inexcusable. Ultimately, the crew of Columbia died
not of first mistakes, but of second, third, and fourth ones. However, in NASA’s defense,
the same technical mishap, falling foam from the shuttle’s external tank, that doomed
Columbia was an event that had been seen in prior shuttle launches with no ill effect.
With history showing that the orbiter could sustain hits from this foam, it could be argued
that nothing out of the ordinary be feared.
Yet there is evidence, provided very extensively in the report of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board, that concerns about the falling foam were particularly
more virulent following the launch of this particular flight. Because the size of the foam
and the speed it was traveling at were so great, a number of engineers were concerned.
When the problem was taken up the chain of command, however, it was quickly stifled
and offers from the military to get high resolution images of the orbiter were declined.
True, had the foam strike been found to be deadly while the crew was still in orbit, there
was probably very little they could do to fix their spacecraft. The possibilities and their
consequences are far too varied to be considered here, but it is safe to say that the saying
“better safe than sorry” was not listened to.
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What is commendable on NASA’s part was their reaction to Columbia in
comparison to Challenger. Following the accident in 1986, many had criticized NASA
of withholding information and not being completely forthright with the country and
investigators. That mistake was not made again in 2003; NASA immediately endorsed
the appointment of an independent board and made itself available for all inquiries.
Intragovernmental Relations
Following Columbia, NASA as an organization, as noted above, was more
forthcoming about its actions to the media and to the rest of the government. The
accident indeed brought new attention to NASA and the nation’s space policy. Questions
of the need for a new program or a new orbiter arose. And while a few calls for the
abandonment of NASA altogether were heard, there were not nearly as many as in 1986.
The Future: Project Constellation
Nearly one year after the destruction of Columbia, President George W. Bush
announced a new plan for NASA, the Vision for Space Exploration (VSE). The VSE
provides for the retirement of the space shuttle by 2010, the development of a new
human-rated space vehicle, the Crew Exploration Vehicle, and a return to the moon by
2020. The plan also provides for the development of a new lifter, the Ares, with enough
power to propel the CEV out of Earth orbit. The Ares would be the first new class of
heavy lifter since the Saturn V of the Apollo era.
The crux of this new project, which would generally require large influxes of new
money into the NASA budget, is the retirement of the space shuttle, which would free up
the requisite money. But there are still questions regarding the “long-term funding
outlook”: the GAO found that “the agency [NASA] will have to keep the program
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compelling for both Congress and potential international partners, in terms of the
activities that will be conducted as part of the lunar program, in order for the program to
be sustainable in the long run.” 70 Thus, NASA will continue to find itself in the same
position of the past three decades, that is, continually justifying a program that costs
hundreds of millions, if not billions of dollars, with perhaps little of valuable scientific
returns guaranteed.
Since this section concerns the future of NASA programs, I will not examine
issues regarding intergovernmental relations and performance as above. Instead, I will
look at some of the lessons that NASA has, hopefully, learned from, and how it may
apply to Project Constellation. These questions include: cost-estimating and budget
processes, bureaucracy versus technology, and questions of what a proper space policy
for the United States would look like and consist of.
One of the biggest problems with both the space shuttle and space station
programs was the ill-informed cost-estimation and budget processes. These low-cost
estimates and claims of economy eventually lead to unreasonable expectations, which in
turn were not met. Combined with this, when the will is not in the Congress to continue
funding projects like this at the level which is required, budgets get cut and capabilities
are then cut from the program. In sum, the combination of these two problems lead to a
snowball effect; low cost-estimates lead to unreasonable expectation of economy,
capabilities get cut, the Congress cuts funds, and even more capabilities are gone. What
is left, then, is a program like the space shuttle, which does not live up to its original
expectations in the least.
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The lesson that NASA should draw from this is that the theory of low costestimates garners support in the Congress hardly ever proves right. The best course of
action would be to completely open with the Congress and the country as to the level of
monetary support that is going to be required for a project such as Constellation. If the
executive and legislative programs still support it after a full evaluation of the costs
involved, then there is a greater chance that it will be funded adequately. Yet even this
does not always prove true. In the current appropriations cycle, NASA’s budget is
projected to be cut; that cut in turn could lead to serious consequences for Constellation,
perhaps similar to what has been seen with the shuttle and the International Space
Station. So what does NASA do when its stuck between a rock and a hard place?
Among the many rocks that NASA is caught between are also rocks named
bureaucracy and technology. Both the Rogers Commission following Challenger and the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board found that contributing causes to the respective
accidents included the tendency for bureaucrats to prevail over technocrats. In other
words, the assumption that the bureaucratic channels, procedures, and hierarchies would
catch any significant problems influenced those in the agency to ignore falling foam or
destructive o-rings.
This bureaucratic tendency also led to a push for launches; in Challenger’s case, it
was a push to get more shuttles up in less time and in Columbia’s case (while the shuttle
Columbia itself did not go to the ISS), it was a push to get the International Space Station
constructed and completed. While Project Constellation may not experience the same
kinds of pressures as the space shuttle has, it certainly will experience some. With
retirement of the space shuttle in 2010, there is a projected four year gap in American
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human spaceflight capability- the CEV, Orion, is not scheduled to be online until 2014.
Thus, Project Constellation will face pressures to get Orion developed and built as
quickly as possible to keep the gap between it and the shuttle small. Where a gap
between vehicles might have been acceptable in the past, one program in particular
makes it quite unsavory now: the International Space Station. With American needs for
personnel and supplies on the ISS and no space shuttle to get them there, the US will
have to depend on Russia for flights to and from the ISS. 71
Dependence on Russia leads to the third problem that NASA and the rest of the
government will have in developing Project Constellation, what is the proper role of
space policy in American society. That this question has never been truly thought though
should be apparent by now; the desires of NASA to continue human spaceflight at the
level it is used to have never been properly reconciled to the requirements of greater US
policy.
Conclusion
NASA has endured almost 50 years of a long and winding existence during which
NASA has been fearful, to say the least, of losing budgetary and monetary footing. Its
performance has suffered and rebounded, it has seen new programs come and go, and has
pushed it own agenda to much success. The question that we are left with is thus, if
NASA has suffered so many defeats and pitfalls, why does it continue to have the support
of the rest of the government in bestowing new multi-billion dollar programs? If NASA
was really doing that badly, would they continue to get the funds that they do? Is there
some kind of cycle waiting to be discovered here? These questions will continue to be
examined and probed in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: GOVERNMENT AGENCY DECLINE MODEL WITH
NASA AS A CASE STUDY
A Model of Governmental Agency Decline
If decline as presented in the literature is not applicable to the government, then what
is? The main argument presented here is that in government, there is no such thing as
decline. Rather, agencies and organizations are constantly in flux, or rather, their
operations change according to political and fiscal resources, which in turn depend on
overall economic performance (Figure 4-1). Thus, the three major indicators to be
examined are money, performance, and power.

Figure 0-1: Governmental Agency Decline
In this chapter, I will present this model and its component parts. It must be kept
in mind, however, that this is simply a model for analysis of government agencies. The
variables that are established for a study of NASA may not necessarily be the same that
could be established for the Department of State or FEMA. It is not possible to specify
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generalized performance targets for all agencies as they each perform different activities
and fulfill different duties.
One other constraint to this model is that it does not cover the initial stages of an
agency. As predicted by Downs’s life cycle theory, new agencies often undergo rapid
development and expansion and as such must mesh the different cultures of previous
organizations so that the new one can develop. These new agencies also have an
enormous amount of political support that has supported their creation in the first place
and as such, their power and ability to get money and resources are likely dramatically
out of sync with their future budgets. NASA can even be seen as an example of this in
what is often called the Apollo paradigm or the Apollo legacy. In its first decade in
existence, NASA was provided with an abundance of funds and support; the argument
whether this was because it was a new agency or because of Cold War political realities
do not really matter here. The point is, what NASA experienced in its first decade
became much different than what it experienced in the 35 years since.
I will examine each of the three indicators in turn and then put forth the specific
variables I will be using in regards to NASA.
Budget
Greenberg puts it succinctly “the politics of science is registered in money
awarded or denied.” 1 The hinge of this model and the point at which it can begin or be
interrupted is money. Money is the ultimate resource that allows an agency to perform its
tasks. Without adequate funding, some things may not get done, some things may not get
done well, or people are laid off. Generally though, the agency is expected to continue its
tasks at the same level (or better), just with less resources and funding.
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The budgeting process is the method through which agencies request funds, get
funds approved, and then receive and spend them. It is not the agency or organization
itself that decides how much an organization should get, any number of people and
organizations influence the budget process through the executive branch to the
legislative. This political process, then, as identified by Wildavsky and others, impacts
the amounts of money that a given organization will receive. Of course, this is not the
only restraint in the budgeting process- environmental factors certainly affect political
calculations. For example, the current budget deficit or the amount of taxes received (and
thus the amount of money that the legislature has to work with) can all affect the budget.
Natural disasters and defense needs can also play a role.
The differences between agencies funded through discretionary funds and
mandatory outlays also play a major role. Hence, we must distinguish between
discretionary and mandatory. Mandatory outlays include those monies, which are
required by law or statute to be spent each and every year regardless of political,
economic, or environmental factors. Items like Social Security, Medicare, other
entitlement programs, and interest owed on debts are included in this category, which, in
2006 took up 62% of the entire US budget. 2 Because these outlays are considered
mandatory, only so much of the rest of the budget is left to fund not only other
government agencies, but also the Department of Defense and the military.
It must be noted that the defense budget comes from the discretionary part of the
budget. In 2005, the defense budget made up 51% of the discretionary budget, therefore,
what was already limited, becomes limited even further. 3 Because of the nature of the
military and the need for them to be prepared for possible conflicts and to fight in current
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ones, the military budget is often what is required by the Defense Department, and not
what is appropriated by the Congress. Some within the Congress may feel as if,
politically, their only choice is to fully fund the military so as to protect the US.
Therefore, although the military budget comes from the discretionary pot, oftentimes, it is
not discretionary in the least.
The source of NASA’s budget are these discretionary funds. Perhaps Caspar
Weinberger, as an aide to Nixon represented NASA’s situation best when he wrote in a
memo to Nixon: “The real reason for sharp reductions in the NASA budget is that NASA
is entirely in the 28% of the budget that is controllable. In short we cut it because it is
cuttable, not because it is doing a bad job or an unnecessary one.” 4 The point of this
discussion then, is the importance of recognizing not only the amount of the funding, but
the source. NASA’s funding must be examined with an eye towards discretionary
funding; it cannot be compared to programs that are legislatively required to be funded.
In order to examine this money aspect of the model, one must first look at the
actual budget levels of the agency. However, this is not the only exercise that could be or
should be done. Comparing the budgets of one agency to others will help to gain an
overall picture of what funding situation was present in any given year. Did a number of
agencies lose funding, was it just a handful, or only one? If NASA was the only agency
to gain or lose funding, then we have just learned something else. But again, the
discretionary nature of the budget must be taken into account and comparisons cannot be
made across agencies not within the discretionary arena.
A number of exercises can be done regarding the NASA budget and the entire US
budget, specifically encompassing comparisons that can enlighten us as to NASA’s
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stance in regards to the rest of the government. While the percent of the total budget that
is directed towards NASA is generally very tiny, we can look not only at that figure, but
also NASA’s percent of the discretionary pie.
A large part of the comparison however, will encompass comparisons between
NASA’s budgets and the budgets of other agencies. Taking into account the
discretionary source and the types of tasks that the agencies perform, I have chosen two
agencies to compare NASA against: the National Science Foundation and the National
Institutes of Health. Both of these agencies participate in research (and development
activities in the case of the NIH), which make them appropriate foils against which to
compare NASA. It is possible to track, over time, the percent of the total US budget and
the discretionary budget each of these agencies received and compare NASA to them.
Performance
Within the performance aspect it is not possible to simply construct certain
performance standards for NASA or any other government agency and apply them to
projects that were not designed to be measured against these ad hoc standards. Not even
within the traditional decline literature itself, do we find constructed measures of
performance. 5 Therefore these measures must be individually constructed for each
agency that is to be studied.
The emphasis on performance in the government has not always existed. In 1993,
the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) was enacted which required
yearly performance reports from federal agencies. 6 These reports, though, were not
required until 1997. 7 Additionally, scholars have found these reports to be “works in
progress” and Beryl has described the requirements as a “tangled set of expectations.” 8
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Criticism of the act has also come in the shape of one of the restrictions within this
model. Implementing a government wide system of accountability is admirable, but can
it truly be done? Is it fair to apply the same standards to agencies that perform widely
varying functions?
Because the GPRA has only been in use for ten years, it does not give much
information concerning NASA for the bulk of the period being studied. Performance
reports put out by the agency in question must also be critically examined; since these
reports influence thinking concerning the agency, they are more likely to be less critical
of the agency in question. While painting the situation in a good light benefits the
agency, it does not benefit the scholar studying the agency. As such, judgment
concerning the use of GPRA reports and other performance reports published by
government agencies must be left to the scholar utilizing the model to study a particular
agency.
The challenge within performance thus becomes creating indicators of
performance that do not unfairly measure programs against standards which they were
not designed to live up to. These standards must be created for each agency being
evaluated within this model and cannot simply be put forth here.
NASA not only deals with human spaceflight but also with science missions. It
would be wrong to weigh both of these types of missions similarly; when NASA
launches a rocket with a satellite or science mission onboard, human life is usually not
risked. But when the space shuttle lifts off with up to seven people onboard, the danger
and the standards for avoiding disasters are much higher. Therefore, when considering
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performance, human missions will be separated out from robotic and/or scientific
launches.
The total number of launches including human, science, and missions which
NASA has solely provided launch services is a base statistic that will be used in this
analysis. The number of successful launches (as designated by NASA) is tracked through
which the success rate of launches in any given year is calculated. Further, the number of
science missions launched in a year will be used to examine performance. For the human
spaceflight program, the number of human flights per year will be utilized. From data
provided by the archive of shuttle missions published on NASA’s Kennedy Space Center
website, I have calculated the number of delay days per year that the space shuttles have
experienced. This figure is calculated from the date of the original planned launch and
when the launch actually occurred. The statistic, however, that will be primarily used is
the percent of on-time human flights per year.
As has been noted before and used previously, reports generated by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) provide a political measure of indicating
NASA’s performance. Since these reports are written usually on the request of a
legislator, the number gives a clue as to the amount of oversight that NASA could be
experiencing. Increased oversight is most likely to come when agencies are experiencing
times of trouble or low performance. Further, the criticisms found in these reports are
often directed towards NASA operations and help to inform the analysis.
Power
Power is an inherently difficult concept to define and measure. White contends
that “Power is not a physical thing;” if power is not something physical, it may be seen as
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completely unquantifiable. 9 Part of the problem of power is conceptualization; what
exactly we are defining, what a definition of power should include, and what this
conceptualization should clarify are all bones of contention. 10 Pluralist theories of power
such as those presented by Robert Dahl contend that power is seen only through the
actions that cause something to happen. More specifically, power is exercised when
person A does some action B to cause another person C to act like A wants them to.
There are problems with this conception, however. Any person can act and thus create an
observable action- it is the result of that action that shows power or influence. Therefore,
we may be able to see a form of power in the resulting action but person A can have
power even if he or she does nothing with it.
It is not so much the question of whether NASA has power, by virtue of being a
government agency we can say that it does, but how much of it do they have and how
they exercise it. So what does power mean with respect to NASA? Ball writes that the
concept of power is likely to be ambiguous separate from its context therefore “Its
meaning is its use, the ways in which it is used.” 11 With respect to NASA, its place in
government, and its missions, NASA’s exercise of power within government is its ability
to get what the agency wants or to persuade others to go along with NASA’s wishes. In
order to guide my examination of NASA’s power, I will employ the following
conceptualization of power: the ability to persuade, convince, or influence person or
agency C to do what person or agency A wants them to do. While some, such as James
Webb, believed that “it was up to the government to tell NASA what to do,” what we
have seen throughout the history of NASA is their pursuit of what they deem to be the
most necessary for survival reasons or otherwise. 12
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An example of this exercise of power of persuasion comes following the
introduction of the space shuttle in 1981. NASA needed something to do with the shuttle
and the justification for having it was thus found in a space station. 13 In order to get
approval for a space station, NASA officials needed to convince the Reagan
administration of the usefulness of such a project. Klerkx writes that “had NASA not
convinced Reagan that industrial suitors interested in lucrative microgravity research and
manufacturing could eventually turn the station into a for-profit enterprise, it probably
wouldn’t have been built.” 14 This has obviously not occurred with the operation of either
the space shuttle or the International Space Station but can be seen as an example of
NASA pursuing (and getting) what it wants- thus using power.
A number of ways to measure power must be considered here. As has been
argued before in chapter three, public opinion may influence representatives and their
actions with the logic being that if the public supports program, than their representatives
should support it to. But as Jacobs, Lawrence, Shapiro and Smith found, the influence of
public opinion to be weak and lower than originally thought mostly because of the
methodological questions surrounding polling. 15
Additionally, the only consistent measure of public opinion regarding NASA is
provided by the General Social Survey approximately every two years in their question:
“Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the space exploration
program?” 16 Asking whether the amount of money we are spending on space exploration
does not equate very well to how much power NASA holds with the general public;
rather, this seems to be a better expression of how the public believes the agency is
performing.

96

Recognizing the limits to conceptualizations of power and thus how to measure it,
the qualitative analysis presented in chapter two and expanded upon below will provide
greater context to the question of power. From this qualitative analysis, I aim to identify
points in time where NASA has held more or less power as seen by its actions and their
outcomes.
NASA as a Case Study
The work laid out here and in the previous chapters has lent itself well to a
continuing analysis using quantitative methods. As such, in testing the model, I will treat
it as four separate hypotheses: one, US economic performance affects NASA’s budget;
two, NASA’s budget affects its performance; three, NASA’s performance enhances its
power; and four, NASA’s power enhances its budgetary gains.
Hypothesis One: Economic Performance and Budgets
As a gauge of US economic performance, I have chosen to use the gross domestic
product (GDP) over the 35-year period in question. As such, my initial tests including
examining for correlations among GDP, NASA’s budget (and the budget broken down
into its scientific and human spaceflight components), the US discretionary budget, the
total US budget, and the budgets of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the
National Institutes of Health (NIH).
As demonstrated in Table A-1 (see Appendix One for all data tables referred to in
this chapter), all of the relationships are significant. What is the most interesting to note,
however, is that the correlation with the lowest Pearson value (besides the correlation
associated with the subdivision of NASA’s budget) is GDP and NASA’s total budget.
This suggests that there is something other than the influence of national economic
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performance involved in the relationship. This fits well with the government agency
decline model (GAD), which suggests that an agency’s power also influences its
budgetary gains. That hypothesis is tested further down.
An additional component of the model suggests that a time lag should be present;
in other words, the GDP in one year more strongly affects the budget in a later year. I
have hypothesized that there is a two to three year time lag present within the model but I
have tested for time lags of one to five years (table A-2).
Two items of importance should be noticed here. One, while all the correlations
remain significant, it becomes less important for NASA over time. The same is true of
the total and discretionary US budget, although these figures still remain higher than the
NASA correlations. Two, the Pearson figures for NSF and NIH grow over time. This
suggests that these budgets are continually growing over time whether due to GDP or
other factors. One explanation could be that the importance of these agencies has grown
over time and thus, so have their budgets. What is important to the analysis here, is that
of NSF and NIH as comparisons to NASA are quite appropriate as they act as baselines
from which to examine the rise and fall in NASA’s budget.
In order to extend the analysis, I also performed a regression analysis testing the
relationship between GDP and the various budget variables. Table A-3 confirms the
findings of table A-1; the relationships are all significant though the effect that GDP has
on the different budgets varies. Compared to the R-square of the total US Budget, the
discretionary budget, and the budgets of NSF and NIH, GDP has the lowest effect on the
NASA budget with an R-square of .877. This continues to suggest that something else is
at work in influencing the yearly budget that NASA receives.
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To further examine the effect of time of GDP’s relationship to budget, I used
regression analyses with time effects for the total US budget, NASA’s budget, and the
NSF and NIH budgets. Table A- 4 presents the effect that time has on the relationship
between GDP and the total US budget. One should note the R-square values decrease
over three years very slightly and then rise by a small degree in the last two years.
Comparatively, the R-square values in table A-5 for GDP and NASA over time actually
decrease from .876 in an analysis with a one-year time lag to .840 in an analysis with a
five-year time lag. This is simply more evidence for there being another variable
influencing NASA’s budget.
The only regression that does not produce significant relationships is that of the
NSF budget over time, though the R-square value does increase over the five years. The
only value that fails to show significance is that of the constant; the beta value for the
independent is significant. Since the analysis of the NIH budget in table A-7 shows
significance for all values in all five years, it may be possible to conclude that this result
is spurious. The correlation values over time are similar and the R-squares increase for
NSF and NIH over time as well, contributing to the conclusion that it is indeed spurious.
Hypothesis Two: Budgets and Performance
The next step in the analysis is to examine the effects that budgets have on an
agency’s performance. It is hypothesized that as budgets rise, so will performance.
Because NASA’s performance is predicated mostly on two major programs, the human
spaceflight and science programs, these factors will be examined both together and
separate. Like the previous hypothesis, I have begun the examination with a look at the
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correlations between the NASA budget and the various performance variables (table A8).
It is interesting that there is a slight negative correlation between the NASA
budget and total launches in a year. This demonstrates that there may need to be time
between the implementation of a budget and the number of total launches, as
hypothesized by the time lag. Further, there is a stronger correlation among budget and
performance factors involving human spaceflight rather than science missions. The vast
majority of the agency’s resources are dedicated to human spaceflight, as shown in
chapter three, and as such these results should be expected. NASA has dedicated an
overwhelming amount of effort into the human spaceflight program because it has
historically been considered more important and shown to draw more funds.
The correlation is also significant between NASA budget and the number of GAO
reports. GAO reports may be a better overall indicator of NASA performance as they
examine many facets of the agency. Since the variables consisting of launch data focus
merely on one small aspect of NASA’s performance, the correlation between budget and
GAO reports should be considered a more valid indicator of performance.
Again, however, the effect of time must be considered. Table A-9 reports the
correlations between NASA budget and various performance variables with one, two,
three, four, and five-year time lags. With significant results shown in bold, one can see
that the same pattern exhibited above, that of significant relationships between budget
and human spaceflight performance indicators and GAO reports, continues with the time
lags. Though the effect becomes less pronounced through the years, this again shows that
the most significant relationships to be found are within the GAO reports and human
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spaceflight performance. Another reason that could contribute to this could be the sheer
visibility of the human spaceflight program. While the various science missions and
other launches are not as well publicized, when the space shuttle is launched, people
know. Since this part of the program is the most visible, it requires the most amount of
money to be successful. NASA would certainly not want to appear unsuccessful when it
launches humans into space as it repeatedly puts human lives at risk.
Since the relationship between the NASA budget and human spaceflight
performance has been shown to be fairly strong, it is only natural to look at the
relationship between only the human spaceflight portion of NASA’s budget to
performance. Those correlations, with time effects, are shown in table A-10. Once
again, there is a rather strong relationship between the manned spaceflight budget and the
number of human flights per year. Though the relationship does decrease as the time lag
increases, it still remains significant through a time lag of four years.
When the same approach is taken with the science budget to science mission
performance, less stringent results are found. The only significant correlation within
table A-11 is that of the science budget to science missions with a time lag of one year
(though it should be noted that it is on the very cusp of significance). Once again and
confirming the suspicions of many researchers, it appears as if the science portion of
NASA is superfluous or secondary to the main goal of putting humans into space.
To continue the analysis, I performed regression analyses of the relationships that
the above correlations found to be significant. These analyses can be found in tables A12 through A-18. Very few of the analyses show significant relationships; in most cases,
only one of the beta coefficients exhibit it. In fact, there are only two of the regression
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equations that show significance for all variables, NASA budget and total launches in the
same year and the science budget to science missions with a one-year time lag. This
again confirms the result in table A-11, in which science missions are affected the most
by the science budget in the year before. It is also evident in table A-18 that the R-square
value increases with that one-year time effect to .151 from .057 with no time effect. In
other words, the science budget contributes approximately 15% to explaining the number
of science missions in the following year.
Both the correlation and regression results deserve some scrutiny, however. For
most of the science missions that NASA pursues, years of planning, development, and
construction are involved, with usually more than one year required. Therefore, in this
area above all others, one would expect the time effect to be more pronounced. On the
other hand, the number of years required for satellite production has been decreasing; the
lead-time though for NASA science missions, has not yet decreased to the point that we
should expect the results gotten here.
Hypothesis Three: Performance and Power
With few quantitative methods of measuring power, the researcher is generally
led to examine the nature of power with qualitative analysis. Since an extensive review
of NASA’s history was examined in chapter three, I find no need to repeat it here.
Rather, drawing from the analysis of that chapter, the aim here is to identify periods of
time in which NASA wielded power, particularly the power of persuasion; since it is
almost impossible to come to a solid conclusion as to whether one has power or not, the
utilization of it implies that an agency had to have had power in order to use it.
Following the rough outline of major programs and timelines used in chapter two, here I
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will consider five possible points in time in which NASA could have utilized power: the
shuttle decision, the International Space Station, post-Challenger, the late 1990s, and
post-Columbia.
The Shuttle Decision
The decision to go ahead with the Space Transportation System (STS) in the
1970s was not always ensured though continuation of the human spaceflight was all but.
NASA Administrator James Fletcher argued to the White House that the US essentially
needed to be in space and Nixon did not want to be the president who ended American
human spaceflight. 17 Thus the question becomes whether the space shuttle decision was
NASA flexing its political power to get what it wanted (a big, brand new human
spaceflight program) or political inertia that required the US to remain in space.
Considering that NASA’s creation was essentially the result of Cold War politics,
as the Soviet Union continued to send humans into space and begin an incredibly
successful series of space stations, an argument could be made that the US could simply
not entertain the thought of ending human spaceflight. On the other hand, with President
Nixon in office and his pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union, an argument could also
be made that the US did not have to continue sending humans into space in order to
compete with the Soviet Union. In fact, the Apollo-Soyuz tests of the 1970s would be
demonstrations of US-USSR cooperation in space, rather than competition.
Further considerations come in the form of the Vietnam War. With more and
more money being required for defense, NASA had already seen the last few flights of
Apollo cut. Partially the consequence of increasing demands for money in other spheres,
this decision also came as a consequence of decreasing public support for the endeavor.
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Now that NASA had gotten to the moon and completed Kennedy’s mission, why
continue going back? Considering all of these caveats, perhaps the decision to continue
with the shuttle program was not so much a consequence of NASA’s power, but of
political inertia mixed with some persuasion. Nixon did not want to end the program but
the public did not want to see a massive influx of funds into a new program. NASA was
this able to persuade Nixon that the shuttle would serve as the appropriate middle ground
as a program that would not cost much and in the end be economically viable.
The International Space Station
Following a decade of shuttle development that consistently ran over costs and
provided a set of orbiters that did not live up to expectations, NASA set out to gain
presidential approval for Space Station Freedom from Ronald Reagan. Billed as the next
logical step, NASA wanted to pursue a space station project to give the space shuttle
something to do. 18 In order to convince an economically minded Reagan that the space
station would be a project worth pursuing, NASA pushed the economic possibilities of
the space station, particularly science and manufacturing prospects in low gravity.
What reason did Reagan have, though, to believe NASA about its claims for a
space station when its claims concerning the space shuttle had all but proven untrue?
Unlike the space shuttle decision, there was no inertial reason for beginning a space
station project; humans were continuing to fly into space in the space shuttle and the Cold
War seemed to be coming to an end. Reagan had initially pledged to cut the budget as
well- giving approval to a project with a large price tag certainly did not fit in well with
that pledge. 19 Unlike the space shuttle decision, getting Reagan to approve the space
station is clearly an example of NASA’s ability to persuade. With no reason to believe
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NASA’s estimates and project prospects aside from its word, NASA pushed (with
support from the aerospace industry as well) to get the space station project started. Not
only would it continue to give its skilled workforce a highly technical project to work on,
it would also continue generating contracts for big aerospace companies, and give the
space shuttle something to do besides releasing satellites and conducting science
experiments.
Post-Challenger
The loss of the shuttle Challenger was certainly a blow to NASA’s prestige if not
its power. The question, rather, focuses on the aftermath and increased funding for
NASA so that it could construct a replacement orbiter. According to Wildavsky’s fair
share thesis, the amount of funding for an agency or department should have nothing to
do with its performance good or bad, rather its associated with an expectation gathered
over years of how much the agency should get. 20 Contrary to this hypothesis, though.
NASA experienced an increase in their budget beginning in 1988 for a replacement
orbiter.
But why build a replacement? Clearly, the shuttle had not lived up to the hype
and expectations that NASA had set for it in the 1970s. The Department of Defense did
not purchase the expected two orbiters and Challenger had shown the continued need for
expendable launch vehicle options. But like the justification for the space station, the
need for another orbiter quickly turns into a rather circular argument. The space station
was needed to give the shuttle something to do and now another orbiter was needed to
complete the space station that was already proving difficult to design and costly.
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Determining what portion of the leverage used to wrangle funding for another
orbiter was from the aerospace industry that wanted continued contracts worth hundreds
of millions of dollars and what was from NASA proves rather difficult. NASA’s
standing was indeed diminished not only by Challenger and the dim prospects for the
shuttle’s operations but also by its not being fully forthcoming in the immediate
aftermath of Challenger. What can be known for sure, however, is that it was no less
than an exercise of power that increased NASA’s funding for the purposes of
constructing the orbiter Endeavour.
George Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative
In the late 1980s, NASA was just beginning to recover from the loss of Columbia,
send shuttles back into orbit and begin to see plans for a space station partially finalized.
With the election of George Bush to the presidency, NASA would also see a new
program which had the possibility of reinvigorating the program: the Space Exploration
Initiative (SEI). Announced by the first President Bush on July 20, 1989 on the steps of
the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum, the plan called for building of the new space
station, a return to the moon, and eventually voyages to Mars. 21 A quick 90-day study of
the plan by NASA into the resources it would require showed the program to be a
commitment of at least $500 billion; much more than the Congress, the President, or the
country would allow to be spent. 22
While the initiation of a new program would be expected to infuse NASA with a
new sense of mission and purpose, the SEI proposal did nothing of the sort. In fact, Kay
claims the proposal “seemed to hit the country with a resounding thud.” 23 With NASA’s
history of forming project proposals in an economically favorable light, the price tag of
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half a trillion dollars seems to be quite out of character. Yet in light of the Challenger
disaster which had the potential of ending the space shuttle program altogether, NASA
was not quite ready to give up on the space shuttles.
Some analysts have claimed that NASA priced the SEI at such a high level on
purpose claiming that, “Having just won a reprieve in a bread-and-butter program [the
space shuttle], NASA may well have viewed SEI as a threat to business as usual, just as
normalcy was being reestablished.” 24 By setting the price so high, NASA knew that the
program would never be supported and it would not have to end the space shuttle
program any time soon; because of the 90-day study, the Congress and other supports
became quite “hostile” to SEI and the program eventually died out. 25
If the explanation that NASA intentionally killed SEI is accepted, then it is
possible to see NASA’s use of power. In this case, the agency used its power of
information to create a plan with a price tag so astronomical that it knew the plan would
never be implemented. Thus NASA’s power can be interpreted as having increased over
the time period between Challenger and the end of the decade allowing it to end a
presidential initiative that would have given it an influx of new money but would have
put a stop to NASA’s signature program, the space shuttle.
The Late 1990s
With no outright event to demonstrate NASA’s usage of power in the second half
of the 1990s, the inference of power is completely subjective. There was no big new
program yet there were no big new disasters either. With popular culture bringing space
back to the forefront and the popular Mars rover beaming back spectacular images,
NASA saw its presence in the public sphere rise through the late 1990s. As reported by
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Launius, beginning in the mid-1990s, the public’s ratings of the job being done by NASA
rose, from approximately 36% of the public approving of NASA’s performance in 1990
to a high of approximately 55% in 1996. 26
Whether public opinion directly influences and changes political support for a
program is a question discussed previously, but suffice it to say here that the connection
is not clear at all. In fact, during this time period, NASA’s budget rose slightly and then
leveled off, if not declined. Certainly, the fact that no major disaster detracted from
NASA’s performance influenced some perception of the agency that it was doing better
in the public. But does this feeling translate to the political environment in which NASA
has to operate? The evidence is less clear. With no huge spike in NASA’s budget, which
if you take Greenberg’s assertion that the politics of science is played out in money, one
could assume that business as usual and program inertia took over through this time
period. A sense of complacency took over, with the agency and the rest of the
government content with the progress and pace. The International Space Station was
looking to be up in orbit shortly and the number of space shuttle missions plateaued at
seven or eight missions a year.
But years of reliable performance can also serve to increase an agency or
department’s reputation as a reliable provider of services. Nevertheless, with no outright
action to pinpoint and identify as an example of NASA’s usage of its power, it is difficult
to say that it even built up power through the rather reliable ‘90s.
Post-Columbia
Unlike the aftermath of Challenger, NASA proactively communicated with the
press and the public as to the status of the investigation. The accident, which some have
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argued could have been prevented, did result, though, in a different, yet similar operating
atmosphere for NASA. In 1986 and 1987, NASA argued for, and got, increased funding
for the purposes of building a replacement orbiter. In 2003 and 2004, NASA got not just
a new orbiter but a brand new human spaceflight program. The question thus becomes
that in the face of tragedy and failure, what is the impetus to give a supposedly declining
organization more money and a new program to undertake?
Since this idea has already been explored in chapter two, the focus should be on
NASA’s usage of power in the aftermath of Columbia. Like Challenger, the agency was
badly damaged and highly criticized for its culture, performance, and actions leading up
to the accident. But for all its pitfalls, NASA was able to push for a new program. While
the accident brought home the fact to NASA that they needed to come up with a
replacement for the shuttle, election year politics also come into play in the decision to
approve Constellation. Up for reelection in 2004 with two wars, President George W.
Bush, announced his Vision for Space Exploration in January 2004, only ten months
prior to the November election. Yet some have questioned and even doubted Bush’s
confidence in the program. As governor of Texas, he never visited the Johnson Space
Center, home of the manned program and mission control. Further, since announcing the
program, he has not made many efforts to support it and increase funding. In fact, most
of the funds for Constellation come from the savings that will be acquired in retiring the
space shuttle.
Columbia vividly drove home the point that the shuttle needed to be replaced.
Seeing an opportunity to push a multi-billion dollar program that would provide jobs in
major election states like Texas, Florida, and Alabama, whether NASA’s power actually
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influenced Bush’s decision or the power of politics did is the question. With NASA’s
power clearly diminished by Columbia, one has to suspect that it was election year ploys
more than NASA power that played a role in the decision.
Tracing Power Over Time
So how does any of this relate to being able to trace NASA’s power over time to
provide a useful comparison to the other indicators? From this analysis, it is apparent
that in the least, NASA’s power has risen and fallen over time. In figure 4-1, I have
plotted my summary of NASA’s power using a scale of one to ten with one being the
least power and ten being the most power. Taking from the analysis presented in this
chapter and chapter three, I believe it can safely be surmised that even if the numbers are
different, that the pattern of NASA’s power is similar to what appears in figure 4-2.
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Figure 0-2: NASA’s Power Over Time

The usefulness of the data being presented in this manner is that this line
chart can be placed onto line charts depicting NASA’s budget and performance over the
years, as has been done in figure 4-3. In order to gauge performance, in this chart, I used
the number of GAO reports but inverted it. In other words, if NASA had five reports
written about it in one year and ten in the next that would mean that their performance
had worsened. If those numbers were placed on the chart as they are, however, it would
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appear as if their performance had actually improved. By inverting the numbers so that
they appear as -5 and -10, a line graph would show the decrease in performance.
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Figure 0-3: NASA Budget, Performance, and Power

To continue the analysis from this chart, it would be best to break it into different
time periods from which to analyze the relationship between budgets, performance, and
power. From 1970 to about 1985, while performance buoyed up and down, it remained
relatively stable along with the budget and power. In fact, through 1985, NASA’s power
remained relatively unchanged and the budget increased. The various numbers of GAO
reports which reflect NASA’s performance at the time are attributable to reports on the

112

status of the space transportation system, or the space shuttle. Between 1986 and 1990,
however, two contradictory things are apparent. One, according to the GAD model, we
would expect the budget to decrease before decrease performance. The budget, though,
continued to rise peaking in 1987 with the funding to build the Challenger replacement.
Second, performance decreases only after power does and again, according to our model,
we should see power decrease only after performance does.
Yet there is a very good methodological reason to explain these contradictory
conclusions. While it is assumed that performance affects power and not the other way
around, the measures of power and performance do not accurately reflect the reality of
the situation. The subjective measure of power immediately reflects circumstances of
any given year (for example, 1986), but the measure being used for performance, that is,
the number of GAO reports, has an inherent time lag in it. It takes time to write reports;
the immediacy of performance is not accurately shown, then, by this measure. While
other indicators of performance could be used in the above graph, none of the other
performance variables used in this analysis have shown significance. We become stuck
between a rock and a hard place, then, with respect to the contradictory conclusions.
Nevertheless, figure 4-3 still allows us to draw some significant conclusions,
particularly in the 1990s. As NASA’s power steadily rose, so did their budget. The
agency performance also improved during the ‘90s, going from a high of 38 reports in
1992 to a low of seven in 1998, a level which had not been seen for almost a decade.
Without better real-time indicators of performance, however, it would not be appropriate
to draw more significant conclusions beyond speculating about the pattern of data.
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Hypothesis Four: Power and Budgets
Without quantitative measures of power, it is difficult to quantitatively analyze
the connection between power and budgets. As such, I will instead examine the
relationship between NASA budget and the rough measurement of power provided in the
above charts. Because of the tentative nature of the power measurement, however, we
must regard any results as potentially spurious.
In a correlation analysis presented in table A-19, a negative relationship is found
between NASA’s power and its budget with the relationship becoming strongest and
most significant when a five year time lag is included (at five years, Pearson=-0.571,
sig.=0.001). While the method of measuring power can not be seen as very reliable, the
results suggest that power does not have a strong positive influence on budgets.
Completing the cycle, we can include the rough estimation of power in a linear
regression with GDP to examine the effect these two variables combined have on
budgets; table A-20 presents these results. Compared to the effect that only GDP has on
predicting NASA’s budget, our predictive power increases by as much as 10%.
Including a time effect of three years, power and GDP work together to help explain up
to 96% of NASA’s budget compared to 86.1% using just GDP. Thus while power alone
does not have a strong effect on NASA’s budget, power in conjunction with GDP, as
predicted by the model, does.
Conclusion
While leaving a complete discussion of results to the next chapter, the major
finding in this analysis is that something more than simply economic performance is
involved in determining the yearly NASA budget. Further, there does seem to be some
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sort of relationship between the NASA budget and the human spaceflight program with
no major correlations being found within the scientific program.
Measures of power leave something to be desired, as quantitative indicators of
how much power one holds, has, or uses are elusive if not impossible to develop. Yet,
we can clearly see that NASA’s power has risen and fallen between 1970-2005 and can
be somewhat projected onto a line graph to match with indicators of the other categories.
Finally, we do see some interaction of power and GDP in the influence of
NASA’s budget, particularly after some period of time has elapsed. We will examine the
significance of this finding in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
Nearly forty years after the US first went to the moon, what has happened to the
agency that put them there? From declarations of an agency in decline to accidents that
might prove the claim to more funding and new programs, what is to explain the rise and
fall of NASA’s outputs through the years? In chapter one, the claim that a new
conception of decline in government was needed was put forward and in the previous
chapters I hope to have proven that. Here, I will discuss the meaning of the data in
chapter four and its effects on the government agency decline model. I will then examine
prospects for further research and conclude the discussion.
Discussion of Results
In chapter four, statistical tests and their results were presented to test the
government agency decline model. The first conclusion that can be reached from that
data is that overall national economic performance does greatly influence budget levels.
Interestingly enough, and pursuant to the GAD model, the effect that GDP has on
NASA’s budget is less than the effect that it has on the US budget, the discretionary
budget or the budgets of the NSF and NIH. As a result, there seems to be something else
influencing NASA’s budget. This conclusion is contrary to Wildavsky’s idea of “fair
share” in that there is not simply a consensus approach to agency budgeting at the federal
level, but other considerations, predominantly economic, are important. To be fair to
Wildavsky, however, no large scale study examining legislators’ attitudes towards agency
budgeting. It is quite possible that this idea of fair share is connected to the economy
such that legislators’ attitudes could be included as an intervening variable.
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The next hypothesis that was tested was that an agency’s budget affects its
performance. A slight negative correlation was found between NASA’s budget and the
total number of launches per year, suggesting that some time is needed for the budget
changes to affect the number of launches. Reflecting the proportion of the entire NASA
budget that manned spaceflight encompasses, there were stronger relationships among
budget and performance factors measuring performance of the human spaceflight
program.
What is also apparent within this concept is the delineation of very public
performance indicators and public indicators relegated to the governmental sphere only.
Launches of satellites and shuttles are quite visible to the general public while indicators
of performance such as the number and nature of GAO reports, while public, is not
widely paid attention to outside of the government. Which of the performance indicators
to use, public or semi-public, is a problem that largely depends on the next aspect of the
GAD model, specifically whether power is public or governmental in nature.
The next aspect of the model to be tested was that performance affects power.
The qualitative analysis clearly shows that NASA’s power has been flexible, certain
points in time can be identified where NASA has clearly used its power demonstrating
that it has it. Using a rudimentary measure of power based on this analysis, a negative
correlation was found between power and NASA’s budget suggesting that as power went
up, the agency’s budget fell. While acknowledging that a better measure of power is
needed since the results could be spurious, the result is contrary to what was expected.
Finally, the last hypothesis examined was that an agency’s power affects their
budget and that overall economic performance is also a factor in that determination.
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Even though power seemed to have a negative influence on NASA’s budget, a regression
analysis with power and GDP as independent variables and NASA budget as the
dependent demonstrated that the relationship is quite significant and highly explanatory.
In the same year and including time effects of one to five years, power and GDP working
together help to explain NASA’s budget more than GDP alone with the relationship
becoming stronger and more significant in years three and four.
Thus far, the analysis has garnered mixed results for the GAD model but another
important aspect is that there should be a time lag between all of these indicators; that
there should be some period of time between when economic performance affects budget,
another period of time between a budget’s effect on performance, and so on. These time
lag effects were also tested for. GDP had the strongest effect on budget in the same year
for almost all of the cases examined. The only exception to that were the cases of the
NSF and NIH, signaling that their budgets increased no matter the GDP. This also
confirms their choices as appropriate baselines from which to examine the budget of
NASA. That other scientific agencies experienced constant and consistent increases in
their budget and NASA did not effectively means that something else was affecting the
budget of NASA.
Similar to the finding that the strongest relationship between budget and
performance was to be found among performance indicators relating to human
spaceflight, time lag effects were also found between NASA budget and human
spaceflight performance. While the relationships are significant, the strength of them
does decrease over time again showing that the strongest relationship occurs in the same
year. When examining the science portion of NASA’s budget and science missions, a
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relationship was found with a one-year time lag. On the verge of significance
(significance= .050), this signals that among science missions we should expect some
sort of time lag as it takes years of planning and development for science missions to
actually occur.
Although power on its own was shown to have the opposite effect than what was
predicted, when the variable is used in regression analyses, it enhances the relationship
particularly after three years. While this is the effect that was predicted, that the previous
hypotheses do not have a significant time effect leads to the question of whether the
results are spurious either for power and GDP’s effect on budget or for hypotheses one
and two or time effects only need to be included in the model for the power to budget
stage. This is a question that cannot be resolved here; the measure of power being
utilized might be the problem which of course would have to wait to be resolved until a
more reliable indicator of power can be discovered. Logically, however, a time effect
would most likely be needed between budgets and performance; money does not flow
directly into projects but must go through mission directorates and be approved for
specific purposes. While there is a slight suggestion that the time lag is present, more
research is needed.
This brings the discussion to a question of what it means for the GAD model.
There is some data reinforcing the model. Some other piece of data does need to be
included so as to enhance the relationship between economic performance and NASA’s
budget. Human spaceflight performance is indeed helped by the budget reflecting the
focus on human spaceflight by the agency, the rest of the government, and the public.
What clearly needs to be reconsidered within the model is the use of a time lag.
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Particularly within the relationships between economic performance and budgets and
budgets and performance, the primary effect declines over time. There still may be some
use for it, however, when examining the other end of the model and the effect that power
and GDP jointly have on a budget.
Limitations of GAD and Ideas for Further Research
The application of the GAD model to NASA is all well and good, but what about
its applications to other agencies? In the data analysis, the budgets of the National
Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health all rose over time, regardless of
the GDP. This would suggest that no matter their performance or the relative amount of
power they held, their budget would still rise; thus, GAD may not be applicable to them.
It seems that what NASA has or lacks (relatively speaking) compared to the NSF and
NIH is the duty to operate in a highly politicized environment. As much as one would
like to, in government, it is quite impossible to forget about the politics of the situation
and the politics of the environment in which you work. A strong argument could be
made that the NSF and NIH make relatively apolitical contributions to people’s lives.
NASA, on the other hand, was created essentially to carry out a political task and it
continues to operate as such.
Downs’s work on the bureaucracy focuses closely on the initial growth stages of
an agency; this is noticeably absent from the model. GAD serves to extend the Downs
analysis and as such can only be applied to agencies that are beyond these initial stages.
In this case, I have joined NASA eleven years into its existence. Arguably, this time
frame could be difference dependent on which agency the model is being applied to.
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The benefit of the GAD model is that it includes as explanatory factors all those
variables, which operate in political environments: power, overall economic
performance, budgets, and performance. Because of this, the agencies and departments
that it may apply best to are agencies created out of or for political purposes. The
Tennessee Valley Authority and the Department of Homeland Security are past and
present examples of this. GAD may not adequately describe agencies that are created to
fulfill specific apolitical or nominally political purposes such as the Internal Revenue
Service, the Social Security Administration or the Department of Health and Human
Services.
Related to this, I explicitly call GAD a model and not a theory; I do not believe it
would be appropriate or possible to develop specific indicators of particularly
performance that could be used across a variety of government agencies. Depending on
the agency and the nature of its operations, performance standards need to be created and
tailored to the specific agency. A broad outline of a theory could be designed to say that
economic factors affect a agency’s (political in nature) budget, which in turn affects
performance and then affects power which then helps to explain that agency’s budget.
Including all of these explanatory factors is a net positive gain over prior descriptions of
government decline and agency growth.
Clearly, more research is needed before the conclusion that the GAD model
accurately describes political agencies is reached. Further research is varied and could
include applications of the model to other agencies, perhaps the Department of Homeland
Security or the NIH as a control. Development of more accurate indicators of power
would also help to enhance the analysis.
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Conclusion
The government agency decline model is a good first step in examining what
affects an agency’s outputs and inputs and in turn, its operations. By including many (if
not all) of the political factors into a single model, it can eventually help to predict budget
levels and help performance by knowing the effects that funding has on it. Clearly,
further refining is needed, but good progress has been made here in showing the
explanatory power of the model.
What must have gone through the minds of the twelve men who walked on the
moon as they prepared to say goodbye to it? Knowing that nothing in their lives would
probably be like the moment they were experiencing right then, the collective minds of
NASA were probably wondering the same thing. Nothing is ever going to be like the
moon, for the moon walkers or for NASA. What has probably spurned so much
discussion of whether NASA is or was in a decline or not was the fact that nothing they
could do besides landing a human on Mars was ever going to be anything like landing
humans on the moon.
Perhaps what is needed for NASA is the realization that while nothing will ever
be like what has been done before, the opportunity for still greater things lies ahead.
Though NASA operates within a politically charged environment that affects nearly
everything that it does or tries to do, understanding the mechanism through which politics
operates can help them and us understand why it is so difficult to get funding for such big
ideas. For other agencies that must operate within similar limitations and the scholars
who study them, having a model that can explain the fluxes agencies experience is
helpful. Decline in government is not really decline unless the agency disappears. And
since most agencies can be assured of their continued existence, I do not believe that the
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idea of decline as applied to individual agencies is useful. If an agency is declining, most
times, it is because of nothing that they have done or can control; it has to be related back
to the environment at large and in this case that environment is national politics.
Memories of the moon landing may be fading now, but expectations of what
NASA can do and will do have the prospect of rising; a declining agency would not be
able to claim that. The challenge is in convincing the public and the rest of the
government (through the mechanism of acquiring power) that greater things can and will
be done and are happening now. Tom Hanks as astronaut Jim Lovell in the movie
“Apollo 13” says, “Imagine if Christopher Columbus came back from the New World
and no one returned in his footsteps.” Even though the moon landings of the 1960s and
1970s are over, there is always continued exploration, no matter the form, to look
forward to.
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APPENDIX A: DATA TABLES

126

Table 0-1: Correlations of GDP to Budget Variables
GDP
Total US Budget
NASA Budget
NASA Manned Budget
NASA Science Budget
Discretionary Budget
NSF Budget
NIH Budget

Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Significance

.994
.000
.937
.000
.941
.000
.805
.000
.971
.000
.985
.000
.962
.000

Table 0-2: Correlations of GDP to Budget Variables with Time Effects

NASA
Budget
Total US
Budget
Discretionary
Budget
NSF Budget
NIH Budget

Pearson
Sig.
Pearson
Sig.
Pearson
Sig.
Pearson
Sig.
Pearson
Sig.

One
Year
.936
.000
.994
.000
.969
.000
.985
.000
.961
.000

Two
Years
.933
.000
.993
.000
.966
.000
.985
.000
.963
.000
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Three
Years
.928
.000
.993
.000
.965
.000
.987
.000
.965
.000

Four
Years
.921
.000
.993
.000
.964
.000
.989
.000
.967
.000

Five
Years
.916
.000
.993
.000
.962
.000
.990
.000
.966
.000

Table 0-3: Regression Analysis of GDP to Budget
Dependent
Variable
Total US
Budget
NASA Budget
Human NASA
Budget
Science NASA
Budget
Discretionary
NSF
NIH

B Constant
B GDP
65.812
.192
2.412
.001
2.120
.001
.292
.0000914
87.961
.064
-.174
.000
-.003
.00000229

Significance

R-Square

.006
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.030
.000
.000
.000

.989
.877
.886
.648
.944
.971
.925

Table 0-4: Regression Analysis of GDP to Total US Budget with Time Effects
Time Lag of
Budget
One Year
Two Years
Three Years
Four Years
Five Years

B Constant
B GDP
92.927
.199
125.538
.206
163.620
.211
204.864
.217
247.377
.222

Significance

R- Square

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

.987
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.986
.985
.986
.986

Table 0-5: Regression Analysis of GDP to NASA Budget with Time Effects
Time Lag of
Budget
One Year
Two Years
Three Years
Four Years
Five Years

B Constant
B GDP
2.537
.001
2.757
.001
3.046
.001
3.368
.001
3.744
.002

Significance

R- Square

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000

.876
.870
.861
.849
.840

Table 0-6: Regression Analysis of GDP to NSF Budget with Time Effects
Time Lag of
Budget
One Year
Two Years
Three Years
Four Years
Five Years

B Constant
B GDP
-.150
.000
-.123
.000
-.091
.000
-.054
.000
-.022
.001

Significance

R- Square

.072
.000
-.136
.000
.240
.000
.454
.000
.759
.000

.969
.971
.975
.978
.980

Table 0-7: Regression Analysis of GDP to NIH Budget with Time Effects
Time Lag of
Budget
One Year
Two Years
Three Years
Four Years
Five Years

B Constant
B GDP
-.003
2.40 E-006
-.003
2.53 E-006
-.003
2.65 E-006
-.003
2.78 E-006
-.003
2.92 E-006

Significance

R- Square

.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.001
.000

.924
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.927
.932
.934
.934

Table 0-8: Correlations of NASA Budget to Performance Panel
NASA Budget
Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Number of Successful
Significance
Launches
Pearson Correlation
Success Rate in Total
Significance
Launches
Pearson Correlation
Number of Science
Significance
Missions
Number of Human Flights Pearson Correlation
Significance
Pearson Correlation
Percent of On Time
Significance
Human Flights
Number of GAO Reports Pearson Correlation
Significance
*Significant results in bold
Total Launches

-.343
.040
-.280
.098
.313
.063
.275
.166
.625
.000
.453
.006
.602
.000

Table 0-9: Correlations of Budget to Performance Panel with Time Effects
One Year
Pearson
-.207
Total
.240
Launches Sig.
Pearson
.323
Success
Sig.
.063
Rate
Pearson
.271
Science
Sig.
.180
Missions
Pearson
Human
.591
Sig.
Missions
.000
On Time Pearson
.374
Sig.
Flights
.029
Pearson
GAO
.524
Sig.
Reports
.001
*Significant results in bold

Two
Years
-.134
.456
.316
.074
.246
.236
.550
.001
.344
.050
.480
.005

Three
Years
-.140
.446
.307
.087
.248
.242
.490
.004
.315
.080
.406
.021

Four
Years
-.119
.525
.308
.092
.276
.202
.434
.015
.299
.103
.412
.021

Five
Years
-.091
.631
.289
.122
.308
.164
.340
.066
.219
.245
.298
.109

Table 0-10: Correlations of Manned Budget to Human Spaceflight Performance
with Time Effects

Human
Flights
Percent
On
Time

Pearson
Sig.
Pearson
Sig.

Same
Year
.616
.000
.449
.006

One
Year
.582
.000
.374
.029

Two
Years
.541
.001
.341
.052
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Three
Years
.486
.005
.310
.084

Four
Years
.435
.014
.293
.110

Five
Years
.342
.064
.215
.253

*Significant results in bold
Table 0-11: Correlations of Science Budget to Science Mission Performance with
Time Effects
Same
Year
Pearson -.320
Total
Sig.
.057
Flights
Pearson .213
Success
Sig.
.212
Rate
Pearson .240
Science
.229
Missions Sig.
*Significant results in bold

One
Year
-.149
.400
.297
.088
.389
.050

Two
Years
-.042
.818
.334
.057
.339
.097

Three
Years
-.080
.663
.325
.070
.342
.102

Four
Years
-.075
.689
.279
.128
.302
.161

Five
Years
-.127
.503
.238
.205
.332
.131

Table 0-12: Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Total Launches with Time
Effects
Time
Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B NASA Budget
35.951
-.756
31.489
-.422
29.589
-.270
29.676
-.288
29.211
-.251
28.318
-.193

Significance

R-Square

.000
.040
.000
.240
.000
.456
.000
.446
.000
.525
.000
.631

.118
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.043
.018
.020
.014
.008

Table 0-13: Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Total Human Flights with
Time Effects
Time
Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B NASA Budget
-.635
.401
-.183
.388
.201
.365
.704
.327
1.193
.290
1.904
.226

Significance

R-Square

.489
.000
.849
.000
.841
.001
.504
.004
.276
.015
.100
.066

.390
.349
.302
.240
.189
.115

Table 0-14: Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Percent On Time Human
Flights with Time Effects
Time
Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B NASA Budget
-2.372
3.741
5.918
3.197
9.377
2.996
12.977
2.777
15.638
2.664
23.236
1.965

Significance

R-Square

.860
.006
.682
.029
.527
.050
.394
.080
.313
.103
.149
.245

.205
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.140
.119
.099
.089
.048

Table 0-15: Regression Analysis of NASA Budget to Number of GAO Reports with
Time Effects
Time
Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B NASA Budget
.011
.872
1.466
.785
2.368
.726
3.577
.624
3.734
.641
5.608
.464

Significance

R-Square

.996
.000
.528
.001
.238
.005
.165
.021
.152
.021
.043
.109

.363
.275
.230
.165
.170
.089

Table 0-16: Regression Analysis of Human Spaceflight Budget to Number of
Human Flights with Time Effects
Time

Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B Human
Spaceflight Budget

Significance

R-Square

-.107
.415
.269
.390
.738
.354
1.192
.318
1.892
.249

.912
.000
.789
.001
.484
.005
.276
.014
.101
.064

.339

133

.293
.236
.189
.117

Table 0-17: Regression Analysis of Human Spaceflight Budget to Percent of On
Time Human Flights with Time Effects
Time

Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B Human
Spaceflight Budget

Significance

R-Square

6.081
3.472
9.794
3.225
13.372
2.990
16.105
2.860
23.501
2.120

.672
.029
.508
.052
.379
.084
.299
.110
.145
.253

.140
.116
.096
.086
.046

Table 0-18: Regression Analysis of Science Budget to Number of Science Missions
with Time Effects
Time
Same Year
One Year
Two Year
Three Year
Four Year
Five Year

B Constant
B Science Budget
2.458
.956
2.033
1.518
2.239
1.333
2.206
1.379
2.376
1.237
2.278
1.383

Significance

R-Square

.002
.229
.007
.050
.005
.097
.008
.102
.008
.161
.012
.131

.057
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.151
.115
.117
.091
.110

Table 0-19: Correlations Between NASA Power and NASA Budget
Length of Time Effect
None- Same Year
One Year
Two Years
Three Years
Four Years
Five Years

Pearson Correlation
-0.464
-0.499
-0.466
-0.456
-0.515
-0.571

Significance
0.004
0.002
0.005
0.008
0.003
0.001

Table 0-20: Regression Analysis: GDP and Power’s Effect on NASA Budget
Length of Time
Effect
None- Same Year

One Year

Two Years

Three Years

Four Years

Five Years

B Constant
B Power
B GDP
5.178
-0.386
0.001
6.116
-0.498
0.001
6.767
-0.569
0.001
8.502
-0.802
0.001
8.883
-0.790
0.001
9.128
-0.748
0.001

Significance

R-Square

0.000
0.010
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.900
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0.915

0.922

0.960

0.946

0.927
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2
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1

1
2
2

3
2
1

1

1
1
1

1

1
2
1

3
3
3
1
2
1
4
3
2
1

1
1

2
1
1

1

2
4

1

2

2
2
2
3

3
2
1
1
1
2

1

2
7
2
3
1
1
4
2
5
3
3
1
1

2
1
5
1
1
2
3
4
2
2
1
1

2
1
2
1
1
3

1

1
1
6
3
5
1
2
2
2

1

1

2
5
1
2
1
6

1
1
1

1
1
3
1
3
10
4
1
4
2
1
1

1
1
1
3
2

1
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1

2
1
1

2

3
1

1

1
2

2
1
1
5
1
4

2
1
1
4
2

1
1

Total

1
1

National
Security

1

Information
Technolo-

1

Transportation

Finances

2

Science

Contracts

STS

ISS

Management

Costs
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

2
3
1
3
3
1
8
10
6
3
4
5
5
2
4
1
2
8
14
6
13
14
38
19
12
13
12
13
7
12
7
11
9
9
7
11
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Indicator/Variable
Budget
GDP

Format

OMB Historical Data Tables
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/h
ist.pdf

US Budget

Billions of
Dollars

Discretionary
Budget

Billions of
Dollars

NASA Budget

Billions of
Dollars
Billions of
Dollars
Billions of
Dollars
Billions of
Dollars
Billions of
Dollars

Human Spaceflight
Budget
Science Budget
NSF Budget
NIH Budget
Performance
Total Launches

Science Missions

Number of
Successful
Launches
Number of Failed
Launches

Success Rate

Failure Rate

Number of Human

Source

Number of
Launches per
Year
Number of
Science
Missions
Launched per
Year
Number of
Successful
Launches per
Year
Number of
Failed
Launches per
Year
Success Rate
of Launches
per Year
Failure Rate of
Launches per
Year
Number of

OMB Historical Data Tables
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/h
ist.pdf
OMB Historical Data Tables
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/h
ist.pdf
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 2005
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 2005
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 2005
OMB Historical Data Tables
The NIH Almanac
http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/index.html
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 2005
http://science.hq.nasa.gov/

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 2005

Aeronautics and Space Report of the President, Fiscal
Year 2005

Calculated from data in the Aeronautics and Space
Report of the President, Fiscal Year 2005
Calculated from data in the Aeronautics and Space
Report of the President, Fiscal Year 2005
NASA Shuttle Mission Archives
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Flights
Total Delay Days

Number of Flights
Delayed

Average Delay in
Days

Percent of Flights
Delayed

Percent of Flights
Launched On Time

Number of GAO
Reports

Human Flights
per Year
Total Days per
Year Human
Flights
Delayed
Number of
Human Flights
per Year
Delayed
Average Delay
of Human
Flights per
Year
Percent of
Human Flights
Experiencing a
Delay per
Year
Percent of
Human Flights
Launched On
Time per Year
Number of
GAO Reports
Written
Concerning
NASA per
Year

http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemis
sions/list_main.html
Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives

Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives

Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives

Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives

Calculated from data in Shuttle Mission Archives

Calculated from a Search of GAO Reports Published
Between 1970 and 2005
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